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Introduction
As is true of many initial audits, whether of a for-profit company or public agency, this Audit
Report relates both “good news” and “bad news.” While some readers may emphasize the bad
news, we believe the overarching message should be that the Cuyahoga Board of Election’s
authorization for the November 2006 election audit is itself crucial good news about the agency’s
prospects for moving forward decisively.
We – the Collaborative Audit Committee and the coordinating Center for Election Integrity –
strongly affirm that independent audits provide information to a public agency that will allow it
to move forward with clear knowledge of its successes, and also of problems that need to be
rectified. In the election context, audits permit the identification of problems with election
managerial systems or technology, such as with voting machines or tabulation equipment, and
thus allow an agency such as a local election board to develop an effective action plan for
improvement. An election agency’s adoption of a practice of full disclosure about (1) its efforts
to identify successes and problems fully and impartially, and also (2) its plan to correct the
problems, is the path toward rebuilding the public’s respect and trust in reported election results.
Proposals to audit elections may raise internal objections because problems may be discovered
that otherwise might remain hidden. But the absence of election audits works to both the
agency’s and the public’s disadvantage: problems may remain unknown and uncorrected, and
questions or charges about election accuracy continue, reducing public confidence in the agency.
Any staff efforts expended to conceal problems not only wastes energies and reduces public
confidence, but also means that when the problems do surface eventually, sometimes in a
particularly injurious manner, the agency may be shaken to its foundations. Better, we believe,
to discover the areas of success and those of needed improvement, and deploy resources to
improve.
With the support of major political party county organizations, the Cuyahoga Board of Elections
authorized this audit, for which we believe it deserves public recognition. While the Audit
participants did encounter impediments and delays to the auditing process, we believe that even
these provided opportunities for learning more about the administrative, technical, or legal
changes that need to occur to smooth the process for auditing elections as a routine matter.
Even though this election audit cannot provide conclusive results on e-voting device accuracy,
and could not be completed in the expected time frame because of a wide range of local
managerial issues, we believe it provides an important first step toward election auditing in
Cuyahoga County and in Ohio. We hope that this Audit Report will assist the Ohio Secretary of
State, all Ohio local Boards of Election, election reform organizations, and other election
officials nationwide in seeing how an independent audit process can be created and function at
the local level. Additionally, we hope the public will recognize that this Report contains the kind
of information that all election administrative agencies need to better achieve the public charge
for producing accurate election results and to facilitate sound improvements in election
administrative practices.
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Executive Summary
An independent audit of the unofficial count of the November 2006 election in Cuyahoga County
was undertaken collaboratively through representatives 1 by both major political parties and a
number of election reform organizations. Cleveland State University’s Center for Election
Integrity and the Northern Ohio Data Information Service coordinated the audit process and
technical services, and also supplied methodological guidance and statistical analysis.
The representatives of the organizations, and the volunteers assisting, conducted two
collaborative audits. They are described here along with some terminology that will be useful in
understanding the audit results.
♦ A random sample of election reports from DRE touch screen voting machines was compared
for consistency with the report of precinct election results from the GEMS tabulation computer.
•
•
•

The DRE voting machine produces a “Long Report” after the election has closed with
vote counts for each race/issue in each precinct.
The central ballot tabulation system software is named GEMS. The GEMS tabulation
reports provide election results.
The SOVC Report is the comprehensive Statement of Votes Cast report from the GEMS
server. It shows the total votes cast for each candidate and issue by precinct.

♦ A hand count of a random sample of absentee or “early voting” ballots was compared for
consistency against a GEMS report of electronically tabulated election results.
•
•

Early/absentee ballots are optical scan paper ballots with voter selections marked on the
ballot by the voter.
These ballots are read by an optical scan reader and with the voting information
transmitted into the GEMS system.

This audit did not evaluate: internal controls of the CCBOE; security procedures or chain of
custody for the Long Reports; or the consistency of individually cast DRE ballots with the totals
recorded on the DRE unit’s Long Report. Additional audit procedures would be needed to
evaluate these areas and were beyond the scope of this audit. 2 For a complete explanation of all
the findings, please read this entire report.

Selected Findings
A. DRE Touchscreen Voting Machines: Audit of the “Long Reports”
Conclusion One There is a high probability that the DRE Long Report (precinct) results
match the GEMS produced election results published on November 8, 2006.

1

For the list of individuals and their credentials who participated in the Audit Committee, see the cover page. For
further background on the authorization of the audit, see Appendix 1.
2
The impediments posed by Ohio state law to more complete auditing are discussed at II. B and III. B.
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Recommendation: We recommend that a random, independent audit of the election
results be performed before CCBOE certifies the election.
(See Top Tier
Recommendation #1 below).
Conclusion Two Expecting a complete set of DRE Long Reports with all data clearly
recorded for all precincts currently is not realistic.
Recommendation: As part of the planned security review, the CCBOE should assess the
viability of using Long Reports as part of their overall security plan, and should take into
account in selecting voting systems the ability to achieve full verification of the accuracy
of election results.
Conclusion Three A number of DREs had been vendor-marked with non-unique serial
numbers; several pairs of DREs were identified within the sample as having serial numbers
duplicated in other DREs owned by CCBOE.
Recommendation: Resolve the non-unique DRE serial number problem by taking a
number of actions with Diebold and internal tracking of serial numbers.

B. Optical Scanning: Audit of “Early Absentee Ballots”
Conclusion One Election result data in the GEMS report corresponded closely to the results
obtained by the audit hand count of the optical scan ballots.
Conclusion Two The sorting process for early absentee optical scan ballots into precinct
batches prior to scanning was neither complete nor accurate.
Recommendation: Hand sorting into precincts and batches should be replaced by a more
automated system with appropriate quality control measures.
Conclusion Three There was a very low frequency of discrepancies that appears to be caused
by a scanner misreading of some of the optical scan ballots.
Recommendation: An audit similar to this, comparing electronically recorded optical
scan results to those obtained by hand-counted examination of the optical scan ballots,
should be performed after every election and before certification.
Conclusion Four Some ballots were apparently scanned for the tabulation at one point but
were not included in the GEMS elections results or on the SOVC, probably because the
ballot batch had been deleted (because of flawed data) and then was not rescanned.
Recommendation: Deletion of ballot batches must have greater quality control to ensure
re-scanning of the deck.

4

Collaborative Public Audit for Cuyahoga County (2006 General Election)

Conclusion Five Some ballot batches were scanned twice producing a double-count of
those ballots and their votes.
Recommendation: The electronic identification of an optical scan ballot batch should be
unique and constant; and greater quality control measures need to be introduced to ensure
all ballot batches are counted only once.
Conclusion Six The electronic identification of a ballot batch may change within the
scanning process and between scanning events, reducing the ability to accurately track that
the ballot batch has been counted, and counted only once.
Recommendation: A mechanism should be developed to record and track batches of
ballots with appropriate quality control measures.

C. Security, Accuracy, and Sufficiency of the Data Needed for Auditing
Conclusion One The CCBOE’s lack of compliance with its own electronic and physical
security policy is unacceptable.
Recommendation. An independent assessment of the security policy’s adequacy and its
implementation within the CCBOE should occur.
Conclusion Two Some indicators of possible database corruption were identified in an
initial database integrity evaluation.
Recommendation: The CCBOE should initiate an independent evaluation of the GEMS
tabulation database by a qualified consultant to ascertain whether database corruption occurred in
the November 2006 election.

Top Tier Recommendations for Systemic Improvement
1. Independent audits should become a routine part of the election process.
Independent auditing is standard business practice and should be applied to our election and
voting systems because of their importance. A reasonable approach might be to perform a
professional or other independent audit after each major election and a collaborative internal
audit after smaller local elections. The time and cost involved do not need to be exorbitant and
will decrease as problems are resolved and process controls put in place. The audit should occur
prior to certifying the election.
Although this audit found a relatively small number of ballot batches that had been miscounted
in the unofficial optical scan count, the audit identifies problems that indicate proper procedures
for tabulation accuracy were not consistently followed. Institution of routine independent audits
will facilitate tabulation accuracy, and administrative and technical improvements, and thus
demonstrate to the public that confidence in the election process is well founded.
5

Collaborative Public Audit for Cuyahoga County (2006 General Election)

2. Reconsider the feasibility and wisdom of supporting two major voting systems: optical
scan and DRE touch screens.
The problems found in this audit, the Election Sciences Institute audit of the May Primary, and
report from the Cuyahoga Election Review Panel (July 2006) call into question whether it is
practical and cost effective for Cuyahoga County to support two voting machine systems (i.e.,
electronic and optical scan). Some factors to be considered include:
•
•
•
•

Election costs for 2006 substantially exceeded the budget allocated;
It is unclear if DRE electronic voting can support the turnout in a Presidential election;
CCBOE staff must be hired and trained to support both systems, and have not reached
high performance standards in managing either system; by focusing on one system higher
performance standards can likely be met more quickly.
The DRE devices present considerably greater hurdles to cost-effective and complete
auditing than do paper optical scan ballots.

3. A comprehensive evaluation of the election database should be undertaken by qualified
technical professionals who are independent of voting system vendors.
Some indicators of possible database corruption were identified in an initial database review but
were not investigated despite the Monitor’s repeated urging. In an independent evaluation of the
GEMS official results database the task should be:
•
•
•

to ascertain whether database corruption occurred in the November 2006 election
database,
and if so, to determine the scope and impact of any corruption for the tabulated and
reported results; and
in light of Microsoft warnings, to provide recommendations on how to avoid tabulation
database corruption to the maximum extent feasible, delineating the steps to be taken to
protect election data as tabulations are occurring.
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Glossary of Terms Used
Absentee voter: Voters who cast their ballots before Election Day, by mail or in-person at the
Board of Elections; they do not vote at a precinct polling place.
Absentee audit: An audit of the optical scan ballots used by absentee voters.
Batch: The digital representation of a scanned deck (or decks) of optical scan ballots as recorded
by GEMS.
CCBOE: As commonly used, this term can confusingly designate either the agency that
conducts elections in Cuyahoga County -- the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections—or its fourmember governing Board. In this Audit Report we use CCBOE to refer to the agency as a
whole, which includes its staff as well as its governing Board. The Board is comprised of two
Republican and two Democratic members who normally are nominated by the local major
political parties and then formally appointed by the Ohio Secretary of State.
CAC: Collaborative Audit Committee—the representatives of the two major political parties
and three election oversight and advocacy organizations (see cover page) who composed the
policymaking arm of this Audit.
CEI: Center for Election Integrity of Cleveland State University, which was appointed to serve
as the Public Monitor of Cuyahoga County election reform by both the Cuyahoga Board of
County Commissioners and the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections.
CERP: Cuyahoga Election Review Panel. The Panel was appointed by the Cuyahoga County
Commissioners and the Board of Elections to review the 2006 Primary Election and make
recommendations for improvement. The Panel published a final report on their findings, known
as the CERP Report (www.csuohio.edu/cei/).
CSV file: Comma Separated Values file; a file format used for data files that permits them to be
read on a variety of computers.
Deck: The electronic representation of a batch of optical scan ballots that will be scanned
together and whose votes will be reported to the GEMS database as a unit.
DESI: Diebold Election Systems, Inc. the subdivision of Diebold, Inc. that manufactures and
markets election voting systems and technical consulting services. Cuyahoga County uses
Diebold’s
DIMS: This is the software program Diebold Election Systems markets for recording voter
registrations, processing absentee ballot applications, evaluating candidate or issue petitions, and
managing poll worker information (It is the acronym of Data Information Management System).
The Cuyahoga CCBOE uses DIMS in all of these ways. DESI materials note it interfaces
“seamlessly” with the GEMS election tabulation software but this interface has been highly
problematic in our County.
7
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DRE: a type of electronic voting machine where the machine electronically records voters’
choices (Direct Recording Electronic). In Cuyahoga County, the DRE model that is used is a
Diebold AccuVote TSX with VVPAT printer. This DRE is a “touchscreen” where the computer
monitor shows the ballot, and the voter “touches” rectangular boxes shaped to look like buttons
to simulate the pushing of a button under a ballot choice. Most of Cuyahoga County voters
currently vote on DREs at the precincts on Election Day.
EAC: U.S. Election Assistance Commission. The EAC was established by the Help America
Vote Act (HAVA). It disbursed federal funds to States for replacing their voting systems.
Currently, the EAC’s prime task is to facilitate election administration improvements. It serves
as a national clearinghouse and resource for information pertaining to the administration of
federal elections, including for the technical aspects of voting systems.
EDT: Election Day Technicians, a special poll worker position created by the Cuyahoga
CCBOE to activate and manage the DRE touchscreen units at polling locations.
Election certification: Formal approval of the CCBOE is required to officially confirm the
results of an election. The date for certification is established by Ohio statutes.
ESI: The Election Science Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan election management-consulting
firm located in San Francisco that was retained by the Cuyahoga County Commissioners in April
2006 to evaluate the accuracy of the DRE touch-screen voting units. ESI conducted an audit of
the individual printed ballots cast on DRE units in the county’s May 2006 Primary election.
E-voting: refers to “electronic voting.” While the term is somewhat contested as far as its
scope, generally it refers to any device on which voters cast ballots, or any election system where
the reading, recording or tabulation of votes cast involves computers.
Flash memory: Internal computer memory within each DRE touch-screen unit, which stores
election, results until erased. Votes cast on the electronic voting machines are recorded in two
places: 1) the memory cards that are inserted before the election and removed after the election
for counting, and 2) in flash memory located on a computer chip which remains inside the voting
machine.
Firmware: Vendor-installed operating software.
GEMS: this is an abbreviation for a computer software program (Global Election Management
System) that Diebold Election Systems sells for the creation of electronic and paper ballots, and to
serve as the central tabulation program for recording and counting votes. The Cuyahoga CCBOE
uses GEMS in all these ways.
Long Report: From the DRE units, a paper printout of the summary election results (votes
sorted into candidate and issue, presented by precinct) for all the ballots that were cast on the one
DRE voting machine from which the printout was generated (from an integrated printer).
Memory card: A removable electronic disk similar to a “floppy” that records the votes cast on
a DRE voting machine. In Cuyahoga County, the memory cards are inserted into the electronic
voting machine before the election, removed at the end of the election, and delivered to the
8
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CCBOE where the voting data are uploaded to GEMS to count the votes cast on the DRE
machine and recorded on the memory card.
NODIS: Northern Ohio Data Information Service, the regional data center located at Cleveland
State University.
NODIS provided statistical and other professional support for the
Collaborative Audit.
Optical scan ballot: A paper ballot, which in November 1006, was divided into three columns.
The ballot lists each race or issue with ovals beside each voting choice. To cast a vote that can
be accurately read by the counting machine (“scanner”), the voter colors in the oval that reflects
the voter’s choice.
Optical scanner: The computerized device used to read and record the votes marked on paper
ballots (“optical scan ballots”). Each scanner is connected to the GEMS computer by a wired
network, where the GEMS program tabulates and reports election results.
PDF file: Portable Document Format, a type of file format.
Precinct: A geographic subdivision of a county, town, city, or ward for election purposes.
SOVC Report: The comprehensive Statement of Votes Cast report from the GEMS server. It
can show the total votes cast for each candidate and issue by precinct.
VVPAT: By Ohio statute, every DRE unit must be equipped with a printer that will produce for
the voter’s review a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail. The VVPAT is the printout of each
voter’s selections. After it prints, the voter must push a button affirming that this is the VVPAT
correctly presented the voter’s choices in order for the ballot to be officially cast and counted.
The VVPAT is the official legal ballot of voters who vote on DRE units in Ohio.
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FULL REPORT
Collaborative Public Audit for Cuyahoga County
I. Background: Achieving Independent Verification of Election Results
Achieving accuracy in reported election results is a primary objective for any quality election
administration. Given the range of recent information reported nationally about possible
problems with e-voting technologies, and also some of the problems the Cuyahoga County Board
of Election (CCBOE) experienced in prior elections, local election reform organizations and the
major political parties sought to have the county’s election results independently verified as
accurate reflections of the ballots cast in the November 2006 election. In early fall, the chief
initial public concerns focused on the DRE touchscreen voting devices which were to be used at
polling places on election day.
After discussions with election reform organizations about their concerns, the Public Monitor of
Cuyahoga Election Reform 3 introduced at a Board of Elections public meeting a proposal for a
Collaborative Public Audit. The proposal pledged that the Monitor would seek the cooperative
involvement of the local Democratic and Republican Parties, plus several election reform
organizations to conduct the independent audit. The proposal also requested the CCBOE to send
a representative to the audit-planning group. 4 Per the reform organizations’ requests, the audit
was to focus on the Diebold DRE touchscreen voting machines that are primarily used in
Cuyahoga County for Election Day voting at the polling locations. Later, by political party
request, the audit was expanded to encompass the optical scanning operations.

Æ Further background information on the process for obtaining authority to conduct the
audits, and the participants and governing structure, can be found in Appendix 1.
The Collaborative Audit participants believe the public deeply desires independent verification
that the election results that the e-voting technology has generated are accurate. We additionally
suggest that both the election administrative staff and the public at large need to know whether
the voting machines’ programming maintained its integrity after the machines passed the preelection testing and were deployed to the polling locations for Election Day. Reliable
information on these and other questions are crucial so that sound decisions can be made as to
the voting and database technologies we used and so that any corrections in administrative or
other systems that are needed can be identified.
We believe that yet another reason led to broad support for election auditing in our county. Our
local and statewide election reform organizations (and perhaps also the county political parties)
supported the initiation of election auditing to increase incentives for the administrative staff
effort to reach higher standards of tabulation and reporting accuracy, and to deter the prospect of
3

The Center for Election Integrity of Cleveland State University per a proposal and testimony prepared by its
Director, Candice Hoke.
4
After numerous requests for a representative or liaison who would serve as a non-voting member of the Audit
committee, the CCBOE Director declined to authorize a representative.
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tampering. The thought was that CCBOE managers would desire the independent audit “report
card” to be a positive report regarding the accuracy and management of the election.
A national Election Audit Workgroup teaming the Brennan Center with the Samuelson Law,
Technology & Public Policy Clinic at Boalt Hall School of Law (UC Berkeley), as well as
several election officials and leading academics has been working to evaluate current audit laws
and procedures, and to provide critical analysis to public officials as they begin to adopt audit
schemes and procedures. The Workgroup has thus far identified five core goals that should
motivate the design of election auditing: increasing public confidence in the results of an
election; deterring fraud against the voting system; detecting large-scale systemic errors;
providing feedback that will allow jurisdictions to improve elections and machinery in future
years, and confirming to a high level of confidence that a 100% manual recount would not
change the outcome of the race.
We agree strongly with this statement of election auditing design goals but would add a sixth:
providing additional incentives for the staff to reach higher standards of accuracy. In order to
achieve these six and other auditing goals, we have concluded, as has the Election Audit
Workgroup, that the independence of the auditing entity is essential. 5
Largely because of the unexpected impediments to election auditing that the Cuyahoga effort
encountered, this audit might best be considered a pilot program for identifying the necessary
procedural or informational components that must be in place in order to conduct an effective
audit of two different types of voting systems. Some of these components can be achieved by
local Board of Election policy and procedural changes but others will likely require the Secretary
of State’s action. Still other impediments exist because of State statutory law but this audit may
assist in identifying the legislative action that would be warranted.
While the audits that were conducted are limited rather than comprehensive and conclusive on
the questions of accurate tabulation of election results in November’s election, the information
acquired should be useful for achieving the other election performance and auditing goals
identified above.
The Collaborative Audit Committee would like to thank the over forty volunteers that gave their
time over numerous days to help conduct this audit. Without this huge volunteer effort, this
audit would not have been possible. We also commend the Cuyahoga Board of Election for
taking an Ohio leadership role in initiating election auditing and thus creating an independent
mechanism for verifying the announced election results.

5

Lawrence D. Norden, Statement to the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration,
Subcommittee on Elections, March 20, 2007 at 2; Candice Hoke, Statement to the U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, March 20, 2007 at 2 (this testimony to the
Subcommittee on Elections that held hearings on Federal Election Auditing can be found at
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6445).
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II. DRE Touchscreen Voting Machines: Audit of the “Long Reports” as
Compared to the GEMS Tabulation Computer
A. Background
On Election Days, most Cuyahoga County voters now cast their ballots on an electronic
voting device called a “DRE touchscreen.” This device allows voters to read their ballot on
the computer screen and push buttons on the screen to register their voting choices. At the
end of choosing their voting choices, the DRE produces a summary page on screen to allow
the voter to check to see whether the machine has recorded the individual’s votes correctly.
The voter can choose to return to earlier pages and change a vote. (Technically, a DRE
voting device is a “direct recording electronic” voting machine that maintains an internal
computer chip memory of ballots cast as well as records the same data on a removable
memory card.) Cuyahoga County owns approximately 6,000 Diebold DRE voting devices. 6
How and why “Long Reports” are produced. Ohio statutory law requires that all DRE units
produce a “voter verified paper audit trail” or VVPAT. When a citizen uses a DRE
touchscreen to vote, the unit prints for the voter’s review a list of the ballot choices the voter
made so that the voter can verify his or her vote before pressing a button that essentially
means “yes, the printout of my voting choices is correct; count this ballot as is.” The paper
on which this statement of voting choices is printed is called the VVPAT.
Cuyahoga County has administratively organized its elections so that all the DRE units in a
voting location (for instance, a school gym) can be used by voters from any precincts
assigned to that location. The poll workers are trained to encode the “voter access card” so
that the machine will bring up on screen the correct ballot for the precinct in which the voter
is registered.
At the end of the night after the polls have closed and the DRE touch screens are being
closed out, the poll workers command each DRE machine to print its “Long Report.” The
Long Report is of varying length but a constant three inches wide (in rough dimensions).
The quality of the paper is similar to a cash register receipt. The print font is smaller than
many register receipts. (See Appendix 5 for a Long Report example).
The DRE “Long Report” summarizes in print (on the register-receipt paper) the election
results for the ballots that were cast on that particular DRE unit. Each unit’s Long Report
reflects the internal DRE unit’s computer sorting of all ballots and results voted on that DRE
unit, providing results by precinct for every race and issue that is present on the ballots that
were voted in that location. The Long Report does not reproduce the individual voter’s ballot
choices; these records are sealed on election night and not opened unless needed for a
recount.
In voting locations that are assigned many precincts, the Long Reports can extend well over
20 feet since the results of each precinct must be separately stated on the Long Report. For
instance, a voting location with eight precincts but with virtually identical ballots for each
6

Cuyahoga County uses the Diebold AccuVote TSX with VVPAT printer.
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precinct will produce Long Reports that will state the results for U.S. Senate, for Governor,
for Attorney General, etc., eight separate times to reflect each precinct’s election results. The
audit volunteers had to examine closely the Long Report for every DRE unit in a location
(which could number as many as 40 units) to locate and record the results for the particular
precinct that was randomly selected for the audit.

B. Objectives and Limitations of the Audit
Objectives. The objective of the DRE-GEMS portion of the audit was to determine whether
the votes cast in the precincts as represented in the Long Reports are accurately recorded in
the CCBOE’s GEMS (central computer election tabulation) results report for the unofficial
count 7 of the election (meaning the election results that were generated on November 8, 2007
not including provisional votes or absentee votes). This audit would thus check to see
whether the DRE memory cards’ recording of votes that were transferred (“uploaded”) into
the GEMS computer matched the Long Report results that were printed at the precinct on
election night before the memory cards were pulled out and sent to the CCBOE offices 8 .
Unexplained discrepancies could mean:
•

The voting data on the DRE memory cards became corrupted, lost or altered at some
point after the Long Reports were printed from the memory cards at the polls to the
point at which the GEMS unofficial report was printed, or

•

The GEMS database lost/failed to receive data from the DRE memory cards.

The audit analysis consists of two parts:
(1) A comparison of precinct-level counts between GEMS-produced data provided by the
CCBOE (in “csv format”) with Long Report data collected by volunteers from a sample
of precincts; and,

7

Unofficial results count most but not all ballots. The unofficial results are typically announced late Tuesday night
or early Wednesday. In Cuyahoga County, the unofficial count excludes, for instance, provisional ballots, some late
arriving absentee ballots, and optical scan ballots cast at the polling places by curbside voters.
8
It may appear at first blush that the DRE memory cards’ arrival in the CCBOE offices for “uploading” is an easy
task to achieve. Actually, the process has numerous junctures where an error can lead to an inability to produce
complete and prompt election results. A few of the steps are:
• Poll workers must understand the sequencing of closing steps so that they eject the memory cards
at the correct time
• All DRE units must be checked to ensure that all memory cards have been collected
• All memory cards in a polling location (which in our county can number high as 40) must be
counted and packed into the appropriate bag and sealed.
• The driver/transportation for memory cards must arrive on time and transport the cards quickly to
the CCBOE offices
As we have observed locally, the opportunity for mistakes and potential threats to the integrity of the memory cards
inhere in the DRE voting system.
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(2) An analysis of the “auditability” (ability to be used for an effective audit) of the Long
Reports, which concerns their illegibility or unavailability (e.g., due to paper tears,
printing jams, or absence from the appropriate envelopes).
Limitations. This DRE-GEMS audit was limited because of (1) Ohio election law and (2)
resources. When we obtained authorization for the DRE audit, we presented an ambitious
plan for conducting it right after Election Day but before the certified count occurred. This
timing was designed so that if any discrepancies were found, they could be investigated and
corrected before the legal certified count occurred. 9
Conducting this audit before the certification meant that the VVPATs of individual voters’
ballot choices were off-limits to witnesses and CCBOE staff. State law compelled the
VVPATs to remain under seal until the recounts occurred, to protect the integrity of the
ballots. (Ohio law explicitly makes the VVPAT record the official ballot and not the
electronic ballot when a recount occurs.) Recounts are permitted only after certification.
Hence, we could not obtain access to the individual ballots to check whether the Long
Reports added the votes correctly.
Even after the optical scanning audit was added to the audit and we knew that we had to wait
until after the recounts to conduct that portion of the audit, we did not request to conduct a
more exact audit of the DREs’ individual ballots to determine whether the Long Reports
accurately reported these votes. Our reasons included:
•
•
•
•

We knew that we could not produce the number of volunteers necessary for such an
audit in mid-late December;
We believed that we had a significant auditing project already and this was sufficient
as a first step in local election auditing;
We explicitly stated at the time the audit was proposed that it was not the broadest,
most optimal election audit that could be run, but we believed it to be a strong initial
step toward independent verification of election results;
Finally, given that the CCBOE Board had planned to initiate a professional audit, any
auditing beyond our Collaborative Public Audit effort could be left to the professional
auditors.

Our DRE audit also cannot check the accuracy of the GEMS results as compared with
individual DRE unit Long Reports. The lowest level of GEMS tabulation results available to
us was the results for the precincts – not for individual DRE units. Thus we could not audit a
selection of DRE units’ reports against the GEMS reported results but could only audit down
to the precinct level. This limitation was thus a function of the software design (as
represented to us by CCBOE Ballot managers) rather than our auditing policy choice. 10

9

Many unanticipated impediments and delays occurred which, with new management and logistical planning at the
CCBOE, should not occur in future audits.

10

Further investigation of whether the GEMS software product has the ability to produce election data by DRE unit
should occur; this question was beyond the scope of this audit.
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C. Methodology
Overview. Rather than audit 100% of the precincts, audit methodology and statistical
science have shown that auditing a random selection of precincts can predict what the error
rates would be if all the precincts were audited. The number of precincts to be audited to
achieve a 99% confidence level in the predictive capacity of the sample will differ according
to the closeness of the results. Closer elections require auditing a higher percentage of
precincts. 11
The Collaborative Audit participants met prior to the election to plan the audit tasks and
procedures. Within 48 hours after the unofficial election results reporting, the Audit
Committee met to select the races to be auditing. The Committee’s selection process resulted
in the choice to audit the following three races in the DRE-GEMS audit: 12
•
•
•

Ohio Auditor General race between Barbara Sykes and Mary Taylor
Cuyahoga County judicial race between Hollie Gallagher and Jeff Hastings
Ohio Supreme Court contest between Terrence O’Donnell and William O’Neill

To ensure that all three races audited in the DRE-GEMS analysis would have a very high
level of predictive reliability, the Collaborative Audit Committee (CAC) chose to use the
closest race (among those selected for auditing) as the determinant of how many precincts
would be audited.
To determine which of these races had been the closest electoral contest, the CAC relied on
the unofficial election results reports. These reports included the votes recorded at the
polling places on DRE units and also the early absentee optically scanned ballots. If the race
was a statewide race, then two results reports were used to determine the electoral margin
between the candidates: (a) the state unofficial results and (b) our county’s unofficial results.
This statistical analysis determined the need for a random sample of 132 precincts to produce
a 99 percent confidence level. (See Appendix 1 for complete description of the sampling
methodology.)
Dr. Mark Salling and his NODIS team generated a random selection of 132 precincts. The
selected precincts were not known to anyone in the CCBOE or in the CAC prior to the audit
team’s arrival in the CCBOE offices for the audit when Dr. Salling provided the list so that
the selected precinct envelopes could be pulled from the sealed bins. 13
Volunteers and professional staff conducted the DRE-GEMS audit of the Long Reports on
November 9 and 14, and December 1, 2006. NODIS professionals created a paper form for
audit data to be recorded from the Long Reports. (See Appendix 2 for a sample form).
Volunteers were trained on site on where to find the correct data and how to record it on the
form. The requested data included:
11

Norden testimony to Elections Subcommittee, see note 3 above,
The CAC selected county or statewide races, with each political party selecting a race and the civic groups
selecting the third race.
13
We recommend that public viewing of the random selection of precincts occur, or that the process be videotaped
with the original tape provided as a public record per the Brennan Center report.
12
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•
•
•
•
•
•

total votes recorded for each candidate in the selected precinct in each of the three
electoral contests;
total ballots cast for the selected precinct;
DRE serial number;
audit materials integrity information concerning whether the Long Report was torn,
incomplete, or reflected printing problems;
whether the report was signed at the bottom, as required by Ohio law, by at least four
persons (pollworkers); and
identification of the audit team recording the data.

After the volunteers recorded the Long Report data on the paper forms at the CCBOE offices,
copies of these raw data forms were made and held for distribution to each participating
organization if requested. The raw data was subsequently entered into a computer at
Cleveland State University for further processing and reporting. Center staff then provided
copies of the electronic data spreadsheet recording the raw data and copies of the paper raw
data forms that were filled out by the volunteers to each participating organization so that
they could check the data entry themselves. Special procedures were designed to prevent
errors in volunteers’ data collection, to verify the data in an ongoing manner, and to provide a
traceable path that could be checked and permit correction of errors in case any were
discovered.
Detail of Chain of Custody and On-site Audit Activities. The first on-site step in the audit
process was locating the envelopes for the selected precincts. The Long Reports, as
mentioned above, are long cashier tape paper rolls printed from each DRE within a given
voting location. On Election Day evening, as the polling place materials arrived in the
administrative offices for tabulating the vote, CCBOE staff removed (in front of trained
witnesses) the extraneous materials from Long Envelopes (that had been sealed at the polling
places) and then replaced the Long Reports in the correct precinct envelope with a new
seal. 14 The staff then placed all the Long Envelopes (that were labeled with a polling
location name and that had been stuffed with the Long Reports) into bins that were sealed
with recorded seal numbers. The staff did not file the Long Envelopes in any particular
order, thus the volunteer auditors had to check each bin seal to ensure the unbroken chain of
custody. They then searched through approximately 40 large bins to find the polling place
Long Envelopes that would contain the randomly selected precincts’ Long Reports.
Working in teams of two and seated at tables in the same room where the polling place
materials had been processed on Election Day, the volunteers examined each Long Report
from a given polling place to locate the precinct results for the three races to be audited.
Because voters from all precincts assigned to the location could use any DRE within their
polling place, every DRE Long Report used in a particular polling place had to be examined
for whether any of the chosen precinct’s voters had cast ballots on that machine. Unrolling
and re-rolling the narrow and relatively fragile Long Reports (which could easily stretch over

14

Midway through the night, the CCBOE staff ceased resealing the envelopes because of time pressures and chose
to rely on the storage bins being sealed.
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20 feet long) was a very time-consuming and tedious process. 15 Selected precincts that were
located in a polling place having few DRE units were much quicker to audit since fewer
Long Reports had to be analyzed.
For each precinct analyzed, the volunteers took an audit data form and recorded at the top
their names, the time they started, and the time they finished. For each Long Report, they
recorded the DRE serial number printed at the top of the Long Report, the total number of
ballots cast from that precinct, and the number of votes recorded for each candidate in the
three audited races. They also noted and recorded information and characteristics about the
report (e.g. if it was torn and how many poll workers signed at the bottom). The name of the
polling place stated on the Long Report was always verified.
By working in pairs, each data step was double-checked by at least one person. One person
read the results off the Long Reports while the other recorded the data. Periodically, they
were then required to confirm each other’s work.
Evaluating the Audit Data The data that volunteers recorded at the CCBOE was entered
into a computer. Then this Long Report data was compared by precinct to GEMS-produced
data (on electronic files), with careful notes as to which results did not match in all races and
total votes cast. Professional staff looked for and corrected any computer data entry errors
that resulted in any of the unmatched results and then examined the data recording sheets for
factors that would account for unmatched counts. When there were discrepancies that could
not be explained, volunteers returned to the CCBOE to pull the appropriate Long Reports and
double check their auditing work. By following this approach, we were able to ensure that
no discrepancies occurred because of auditor data-recording errors.
The Center’s professional staff also calculated the frequency of discrepancies that occurred
as well as all Long Report materials problems (e.g., torn, incomplete, or unsigned).

D. Findings
Comparison of Counts and Accuracy of the Tabulation. Among the 132 precincts for
which we recorded Long Reports data, 95 precincts’ election results data for the three races
and total ballots cast perfectly matched the GEMS computer data for all three races and total
ballots cast. While it is possible that the Long Reports data match the GEMS data only
because of balancing errors in both, the probability of that occurring is extremely small. Thus
we conclude that since the data in the DRE Long Reports correctly matched the GEMS
counts for those precincts and within the limitations discussed above, both sources of data
correctly presented the votes for those precincts and election races.
Among the remaining 37 precincts (see Appendix 6 “All Unmatched Precincts”), for some
precincts the data collection was harmed owing to torn or illegible Long Reports that affected
only a portion of the three races to be audited. Wherever we had a complete set of results for
a chosen race, we compared those races even if one or both of the other races’ data could not
15

By chance, the largest polling location in Cuyahoga County, Brook Park -- having 40 DRE units – was in our
random sample. So we had to analyze all 40 Long Reports in order to record the one selected precinct’s data.
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be analyzed because the Long Report was torn or quit printing in precisely the location where
that needed data was located. We found that Long Reports from six more precincts had
sufficient data that at least some of the three races were auditable. For each race that could
be audited, the Long Report data matched the GEMS computer data exactly.
The other 31 precincts, however, were not auditable because, owing to one or more materials
problems with the Long Reports (including missing reports, reports that were torn, reports
reflecting printing problems due to printer jams), some essential data was not available for
each of the three races we were auditing. The Long Reports deficiencies for these 31
precincts were noted by volunteers when they were attempting to record all the requisite
election data needed.
Missing or defective Long Reports led to an inability to audit a sample size as large as
originally planned. The sample design attempted to take into account a limited number of
such problems by adding another 20 percent to the sample size. Clearly the problems of
missing or damaged reports exceeded reasonable expectations.

Points Raising Concerns
Duplicate DRE Serial Numbers. We found several Long Reports with the same DRE serial
number but that recorded different election results (see Appendices 4 and 5).
In one case, two sets of two DRE Long Reports (each pair having the same DRE serial
number) presented different vote counts. Rather surprisingly, each of these two pairs of DRE
machines was assigned to a common polling location. In each of these cases, the votes
reflected in each of the four Long Reports appear to have been included within the GEMS
totals; when we included all four DREs’ votes for comparison with GEMS, the GEMS totals
matched the Long Reports perfectly.
In another case of duplicate Long Reports, we found a pair of reports from DRE units having
the same DRE serial number, but these DREs were assigned to different polling locations.
When asked about these duplicate serial numbers, a representative of the CCBOE stated the
following in an email:
It appears as though Diebold transposed serial numbers when it loaded firmware [vendorinstalled operating software] into these machines. The serial numbers on the machines
themselves are sequential (hardware). This is problematic because the linkage to the
memory card is off the serial number presented by the screen….

If indeed the serial numbers were entered by Diebold, including some mistaken duplicate
numbers, and then shipped to the CCBOE, the chances of two machines with duplicate serial
numbers ending up at the same polling location within our sample is extremely unlikely.
Given that we found this situation twice in our sample, this explanation merits further
exploration. We have not been provided any further explanation from Diebold or from the
CCBOE.
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No DRE Serial Number. The audit found 19 instances where the DRE serial number was
missing from the Long Report or otherwise unavailable. This problem relates to the issue of
torn and printing problems noted above.
Five-digit DRE Serial Numbers. Of unknown implication and importance we note here that
we found two instances where the recorded DRE serial numbers were five digits in length.
This is at variance from the six-digit length that we found for all the other serial numbers that
were recorded. While this might be a data entry error in the audit process, it also may reflect
an error in the manufacturer’s creation of the serial numbers. We did not make an extra
check to ascertain whether it arose from a data entry error.
Other Problems with the Long Reports
Legally Required Poll Worker Signatures: Among the 1,168 DRE Long Reports that
the auditing teams examined, 354 or 30 percent lacked the legally specified four signatures.
Among these 181 (16 percent of the total) had three signatures, 63 had only two signatures
and two Long Reports had only one. 108 Long Reports weren’t signed at all (9%).
Defective Long Reports: Volunteers recorded information showing that 95 reports
(8%) were torn, incomplete, or had apparently jammed in printing and that they either lost or
may have lost Long Report data that was to be printed. These figures exclude instances
where we found a second Long Report from the same DRE unit, evidently printed to replace
a report with such problems. Given that we found and used for the audit a number of what
appear to be replacement Long Reports, the 8% figure for the rate of defective Long Reports
is a lower rate than actually occurred.
Lack of Agreement between Unofficial PDF Versus Sum of Three CSV Files. The PDF file
of unofficial results that the CCBOE posted on its website presents totals that differ by very
small amounts from the sum of the three unofficial CSV files (DRE polling place, early
absentee on optical scan ballots, and “walk-in” absentee ballots on DREs at the CCBOE) we
obtained from the Ballot Department to use in our audit.
The accumulation of vote totals in the CSV files and the election results as presented in the
published PDF file should reflect the exact same totals for the unofficial results, but 128
precincts out of the 1,434 in the county do not match. They generally only differ by one or
two votes. We do not have an explanation for this discrepancy (see Appendix 7 for complete
list of precinct discrepancies). For fuller exploration of data reliability issues, see Section IV.
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E. Conclusions
Conclusion 1
There is a high probability that the DRE Long Report results match the GEMS
produced data for the election on November 7, 2006.
This conclusion is important and reassuring. For all of the randomly selected precincts for
which the Long Reports were legible and available, the Long Reports vote totals for
candidates matched the GEMS election results exactly. More precisely, of the 132 precincts
randomly selected for the audit, 95 matched the GEMS totals exactly. The balance of the
precincts could not be evaluated because of missing or incomplete Long Reports. 16
Conclusion 1, however, assumes that the Long Reports accurately reflect the ballots cast. As
explained above in the report, the accuracy of the Long Reports was not evaluated by this
audit. To be clear, for an election audit to be able to assess the likelihood that voters’ ballots
cast on DRE units are accurately reflected in the reported election results, we would need
audits (using scientific sampling) of at least three separate phases of the election voterecording and tabulation process:
a. an audit of the individual voters’ ballots cast on DRE units to determine if the
Long Report (a summary of all ballots and votes cast on that unit) accurately
reflected the votes; plus
b. an audit checking the correspondence of the DRE Long Reports to the GEMS
tabulation data; plus,
c. an audit of the GEMS tabulation data to determine whether the results reported in
the Totals lines accurately reflect the votes in the selected columns.
Additionally, for utmost confidence in reported election results, an audit covering all three
phases is needed at both the pre-certification and after the official canvass or certified count
stages of election reporting.
Conclusion 2
Expecting a complete set of DRE Long Reports with all data clearly recorded for all
precincts currently is not realistic.
This conclusion is based on the problems we encountered with Long Reports (e.g., torn,
missing, printing problems) in 37 of the 132 precincts in our sample. The 132 precincts
within the sample included 1,414 DRE machines so that would mean that 1,414 Long
Reports were analyzed. Of this number, 181 (13%) were not auditable. Since, as noted
above, voters could lawfully vote on any DRE in the polling place, some of these Long
16

We determined whether there were “missing” Long Reports based upon an electronic file we received from the
CCBOE listing the number of DREs at each polling place. We expected to find a Long Report for each DRE. It
should be noted, however, that the CCBOE apparently had another list with a slightly different DRE count per
polling place. As we had no way of knowing which was more accurate, we used the file sent to us via official
CCBOE channels.
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Reports recorded results for more than one precinct in our sample. In those cases, the
damaged Long Report could cause the exclusion of two randomly selected precincts from the
audit.
These results are consistent with the ESI report’s finding that 9.66 percent of the VVPAT
ballots were defective or compromised in some fashion in the May 2006 primary. 17
Some of the Long Reports that CCBOE workers could not find for us may exist but could
have been misfiled within the CCBOE on Election Night because precinct materials were
flooding into the building and the staff was focused on retaining and uploading memory
cards.
Producing legible and complete Long Reports is difficult for a number of reasons:
•
•

Printer jams are common;
With the addition of electronic voting and voter ID requirements, poll worker duties
have become more complicated;
• Changing and reloading TSx printer paper is a complicated process, with a number of
possible errors that can cause printer failure or marred Long Reports
• In this county, nearly 6,000 Long Reports will need to be produced by poll workers
who have had four to eight hours of training (often occurring weeks before the
election); and
• At the closing of the polls when the Long Reports need to be printed, poll workers are
tired and the focus is on hurrying to obtain the memory cards so they can be sent for
tabulation.
Neither this recommendation nor its attempt to outline the causes of defective Long Reports
should be taken to suggest that the CCBOE should relax or eliminate the effort to achieve
proper printing of the Long Reports at the polling places. Improvements in poll worker
training should help to reduce the number of problematic Long Reports, and this should be an
objective when planning improvements for poll worker training.
Yet we must also point out that a voting system that leaves 8-13% of the precincts
unauditable is highly problematic and will likely have serious consequences for voter
confidence.
Conclusion 3
Some DREs have serial numbers that are non-unique and duplicate those found on
other DRE units owned by the CCBOE.
Our audit discovered some Long Reports having duplicate serial numbers, apparently printed
by separate DREs that have been manufacturer-marked with the same serial number. Given
that we found this problem in a random sample of Long Reports having predictive capacity,
it is likely that other Cuyahoga County DREs have duplicate serial numbers. The Board of
Elections believes that this duplication occurred due to Diebold transposing serial numbers
17

“DRE Analysis for May 2006 Primary Cuyahoga County, Ohio,” Election Science Institute (August 2006), 102124.
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when it loaded firmware into the DREs, thus resulting in two machines having the same
serial number.
Duplicate serial numbers raise at least three potentially harmful outcomes for the accuracy of
vote counts, dependent upon whether certain safeguards are embedded in the GEMS
software; this professional assessment of GEMS protections is beyond the scope of the audit.
First, if GEMS is allowing data associated with the same serial number to be uploaded twice,
votes from the same DRE could potentially be counted twice. Conversely, if two DREs have
the same serial numbers, there is a risk of GEMS not allowing the votes from both voting
units to be uploaded and overwriting the votes of one machine, thus losing votes. Third,
correct and unique serial numbers are also essential for being able to pull the correct vote
records from DRE flash memory when a memory card is missing or unusable.
Additionally, at least three possible logistical and administrative problems are raised by the
duplicate serial number problem. First, duplicate serial numbers make it impossible to audit
machine performance across multiple elections. Second, the serial numbers may also need to
be unique for warranty purposes. Third and last, the duplicate numbers may impede correct
internal tracking of the machine’s physical location in CCBOE records.

F. Recommendations for CCBOE Action
Recommendation 1
Develop an Independent Random Audit Policy and Practice for Validating E-Voting
Election Results.
We recommend that an independent random audit of the election results be performed before
CCBOE certification of the election. Ideally, however, to verify the official count and its
reported results, an audit would be performed after the official count but before those results
were presented to the CCBOE Board for a certification vote. This timing would be optimal,
because it is the point at which all ballots have been counted and the CCBOE believes it is
ready to certify the results. Thus, any discrepancies can be corrected before certification.
Given, however, that the Ohio General Assembly recently shortened the time frame for
certification by almost a week, this optimal timing of the audit may not be feasible. But with
advance logistical planning and better procedures and staffing within the CCBOE, it might
still be possible to achieve this objective.
The largest problem currently, however, is the lack of any CCBOE procedures to undertake
an independent verification of the election results generated by the GEMS software results
before certification. Quoting the Brennan Center landmark report “The Machinery of
Democracy: Voting System Security, Accessibility, Usability, and Cost:”
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Systems with voter-verified paper records provide little, if any, security benefit over
systems without such records, unless there are regular audits and/or recounts of the
paper records. 18

The Collaborative Audit Committee is willing to work with the CCBOE to develop a plan
and procedures under which expedited random auditing of every election and to help identify
the time frame within which the auditing can occur. This Audit Report can provide a
template of the explanatory information the public needs to understand the process.
Overview material about the voting systems can be simply restated with each election audit
so that the audit report could be issued very quickly.
While undoubtedly the best source for verification of the results is to use the voter-verified
paper audit trail (VVPAT), by State law the VVPAT cannot be unsealed until the recounts
occur (after certification). Statutory law further bars auditing activities that might piggyback
on the recount process. Given these state law impediments to random auditing of the
VVPAT before certification and also during the recounts, it may be that auditing the Long
Reports as against the GEMS results is acceptable until state law changes can be achieved.
Because eight to ten percent of the Long Reports are likely to be damaged and unusable in
verification procedures, their value for verification audits is compromised. But it appears
that use of the Long Reports is the only mechanism for auditing DRE units at present. Thus,
neither this recommendation nor its attempt to outline the causes of defective Long Reports
should be taken to suggest that the CCBOE should relax or eliminate the effort to achieve
proper printing of the Long Reports at the polling places so long as the DREs are being used.
Improvements in poll worker training should help to reduce the number of problematic Long
Reports, and this should be an objective when planning improvements for poll worker
training.
Yet we must also point out that a voting system that leaves 8-13% of the precincts
unauditable cannot command the voters’ trust. This high proportion of unauditable precincts
means that in many races, the margin of victory is substantially closer. We understand that
the vendor is planning to introduce a new printer model that may have fewer problems. But
we believe (given the issues identified in bullet points immediately above) that the human
elements and the fact that virtually no mechanical device is 100 percent perfect will mean
that the printers will continue to produce a proportion of problematic VVPATS and Long
Reports.
These facts about the rates of precinct unauditability owing to printer difficulties should be
taken into account when assessing the long-term viability of using the DREs in Cuyahoga
County.

18

“The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World,” Brennan Center Task Force on
Voting System Security, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, 2006.
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Recommendation 2
As part of the planned security review, the CCBOE should assess the viability of using
Long Reports as part of its overall security and accountability plan.
Our audit calls into question the feasibility of expecting to use Long Reports as part of any
oversight or audit process because of the frequent problems encountered in printing them.
The technology and human factors involved in producing the Long Reports should be
evaluated to determine if the process can be improved or replaced by other security methods.
Recommendation 3
Resolve the non-unique DRE serial number problem by taking a number of actions.
The occurrence of duplicate DRE serial numbers raises the possibility that the vote totals
from one DRE unit may overwrite votes from another unit or be counted twice. Duplicate
DRE serial numbers may also lead to CCBOE inability to identify correctly a DRE unit
whose internal (flash) memory needs to be used for the re-creation of voting results
(normally when a memory card is missing or damaged), and other problems discussed above.
These potential problems present sufficient cause to warrant further investigation by
qualified independent professionals (not manufacturer employees or contractors) and a public
report on findings and corrective actions taken.
We believe the following steps are needed:
• Determine all the purposes for which DRE serial numbers are used within the CCBOE;
• Investigate the extent of the problem of duplicate serial numbers on DREs by checking
both the number located on the external casing of every DRE unit and also the serial
number that has been loaded into the firmware and publish the results of the inquiry;
• Fully investigate and analyze why duplicate serial numbers were found on Long
Reports and what the consequences are for vote tabulation (e.g., whether votes can be
uploaded twice or overwritten because of this problem);
• Require the vendor (Diebold Election Systems, Inc.) to correct the non-unique serial
number problem and also pay for the investigation of the extent of the problem; and
• Create and maintain a database of all DREs to track serial numbers, testing results,
polling place location, malfunctions and service history, lifetime vote totals, and
warranty information.

III. Optical Scanning: Audit of “Early Absentee Ballots”
A. Background
“Optical scan ballots” are paper ballots that list each race or issue and provide ovals beside
each voting choice. The voter is directed to color in the oval beside the candidate or issue
answer that reflects the voter’s choice. Cuyahoga County’s optical scan ballots are printed
on both sides. The optical scanner is a device that reads and records the ballot choices the
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voter made if his/her marks were made correctly. Underlining a candidate’s name or placing
an X in the oval, for instance, are not valid marks that the scanner can read.
While some election jurisdictions use scanners at the polling place to scan ballots and
tabulate voting results for each precinct (a “precinct-count” system), Cuyahoga County and
other jurisdictions scan all optical scan ballots at a central location (a “central-count”
system). Numerous scanners are used simultaneously to scan the ballots. Scanners are
linked together in a network with the GEMS computer, which receives and records the
scanned voting data and tabulates the election results.
In Cuyahoga County, optical scan ballots are provided to a number of different types of
voters. All mailed absentee ballots are paper optical scan ballots, whether mailed to homes
in Cuyahoga County or to overseas absentee voters. But paper optical scan ballots are also
provided at the polling places for provisional ballot voters and for “curbside” voters who are
disabled and cannot enter the polling place to vote. Additionally, backup paper ballots are
provided to each precinct in case there were problems with the DRE touch screen units or
excessive wait times for voters.
in November 2006, Cuyahoga County’s policy was to scan, tabulate, and announce in its
“unofficial results” only those absentee ballots that were received in the CCBOE offices by
Friday, November 3rd, at 5:00 p.m. These are often called “early absentee ballots.” As these
voted ballots arrived during the weeks preceding Election Day, the CCBOE staff sorted the
absentee ballots (still in their sealed envelopes) into precincts. Then, beginning on Saturday,
November 4th, CCBOE staff opened, unfolded, and stacked the paper ballots so that they
could be compressed flat. This flattening process was designed so that the ballots would be
more easily fed into the scanners and the scanners would be more likely to read the votes
correctly.
All absentee ballots that arrived after the Friday cut-off time and all precinct-cast optical scan
ballots were segregated from the early absentee ballots and locked up until after Election Day
and the unofficial results were reported. These later-arriving absentee and precinct-cast
paper ballots were counted and presented only as part of the official, certified election result
totals.

B. Objectives and Limitations of the Audit
Objectives. The objective of this portion of the audit was to ascertain whether the early
absentee ballot votes were accurately reflected in the GEMS reports of the unofficial
electoral results. A hand count of randomly selected precincts’ early absentee ballots by
teams of volunteers was compared with the GEMS totals to check for any discrepancies.
Unexplained discrepancies could indicate any of a number of different types of problems.
Unlike the DRE audit, which only audited summary data by precinct from Long Reports, this
audit of optical scan ballots compared actual voted ballots with the GEMs tabulation.
Limitations. As with the DRE audit, this audit of early absentee ballot scanning was of a
limited nature because of (1) Ohio election law and (2) resources. When the major political
parties requested the extension of the collaborative audit to encompass optical scan absentee
ballots, we checked with the CCBOE on when the audit’s necessary hand count could occur.
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The Ballot Department managers said that, as with the VVPAT, the paper ballots would need
to be locked, sealed, and unavailable for auditing until after certification and all recounts, per
the Ohio recount statute. This meant that the absentee ballot hand count could not occur until
mid- to late-December.
Conducting this scanning audit after certification and the recounts meant that we were in the
midst of the university exam and December holiday season. We knew that it would be
difficult to assemble sufficient volunteers to conduct a hand count of three races so the CAC
chose to audit only one race, that of the State Auditor (Sykes-Taylor). We also knew that
since the CCBOE Board had announced a plan to undertake a professional audit, any optical
scan auditing beyond our Collaborative Public Audit effort could be left to the professional
auditors.
Given that we only hand-counted one race and compared these results to the GEMS totals
produced in the unofficial count, the audit conclusions are limited.
We know that
sometimes, depending on the ballot location of a race and how close its placement is to the
vertical column lines, the scanners may prove differentially accurate in reading votes. 19 Our
audit of only one race could not take account of such factors and identify resulting
discrepancies. The Logic and Accuracy testing of the scanners is supposed to identify any
problematic scanners so that the CCBOE deploys only those scanners having a perfect
accuracy in reading paper ballots are used.

C. Methodology
Overview. At the request of the Audit Committee, Dr. Mark Salling and Ellen Cyran of
NODIS at CSU generated a random selection of precincts different from that used for the
DRE audit. The 72 precincts selected provided a 99% confidence standard. The Audit
Committee selected the State Auditor’s race for the Audit.
Detail of Chain of Custody and On-site Audit Activities As noted above, the CCBOE staff
sorted the absentee ballots (sealed in their envelopes) into precincts. They were then taken to
locked rooms to be preserved until time for opening and scanning. On Saturday, November
4, the early absentee ballots were removed from the locked rooms and brought to the “pink
room” for opening. The ballots were placed flat in stacked bins. The bins were placed in
locked rooms until the time for the early scanning. The CCBOE staff then sorted the ballots
into pre-marked envelopes so that each precinct’s ballots could become a “deck” unless the
precinct had a particularly large number of ballots cast. Then the precinct’s ballots were
divided into two or three separate decks. The CCBOE purchased a machine that counted the
number of ballots that were in each envelope, and staff recorded the number on the
envelope’s label.

19

See, e.g., the CERP Final Report concerning the scanning problem in May 2006, in which only particular races
were not read accurately and correlated highly to ballot placement and formatting issues. Also see the Systest Labs
Report concerning the optical scanning problem that is found in CERP Appendix.
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The early absentee ballot envelopes were brought down to the basement scanning area that
had been specially constructed for this early absentee scanning. Up to 100,000 absentee
ballots were expected to have arrived in time for the early count—many times more than in
any previous election. 20 After the early absentee scanning on November 6, the ballots were
locked again.
The on-site hand count audit activities occurred on December 6, 8 and 29, 2006. A team of
volunteers returned on February 16, 2007 to double-check discrepancies. At the outset of
each day of the audit, approximately 20-30 precinct files (the number the auditors felt they
could complete in the day) were pulled by CCBOE staff from the third floor vault where all
early absentee ballots were stored. Members of the audit team observed the unlocking of the
ballot vault and the transporting of the optical scan ballots to the “pink room.” At no time
during the audit activities did the auditors leave the ballots unattended or unsecured.
The CCBOE managers represented that even though the audit occurred after all recounts,
only CCBOE staff could legally touch the ballots. 21 This rule meant that scheduling the hand
count of the optical scan ballots was dependent upon the availability of CCBOE staff.
Each hand count team of auditing volunteers was composed of four people: one “reader” of
the ballot/race, one “observer/confirmer” that the reading was correct, and two “recorders”
who recorded separately. 22 Because only CCBOE staff can touch a ballot, one CCBOE
staffer handled and turned each ballot as the vote was being read and recorded by volunteers.
The CCBOE assigned two of their staffers (one Democrat, one Republican) to be present at
all time per the managers’ representation of the law governing the handling of voted ballots.
The audit recorders first recorded in ink on the audit forms (see Appendix 8 for sample form)
all location and batch information from the label on the front of the precinct envelope. The
CCBOE staff (with close monitoring by the four auditor volunteers) then separated out the
pages that contained the State Auditor race. This segregation of the needed ballot pages
generated a faster auditing process. Upon realizing that some decks included some ballots
from other precincts mixed within the selected precinct (“misfilings”), the reader and
confirmer (and CCBOE staffer) checked the name and number of the precinct on the bottom
of each page to make sure it was from the correct precinct.
All votes were to be classified in one of four ways by the reader who called out the vote:
“Taylor” or “Sykes” or “no vote” or “unable to determine.” The confirming volunteer watched
carefully to ensure the accuracy of the reader’s call. Periodically volunteers switched roles to
keep everyone fresh.

20

Reasons for the sharp increase in absentee ballots included (1) the 2006 Ohio statutory change to permit “noexcuse absentee ballots” (allowing virtually any voter who wanted to vote by absentee to do so), and (2) the
Cuyahoga County Commissioners’ public campaign to encourage voting by absentee ballot.
21
We are not sure that this representation as to the legal constraints on touching the ballots is correct. In the summer
2006 ESI audit of the VVPAT, it appeared that ESI employees were touching the DRE ballot as a part of their audit
activities.
22
State law hand count “best practices” collected in the study that the U.S. Election Assistance Commission funded
provide for at least these four positions in a hand count team to ensure accuracy. (Study by Prof. Thad Hall of the
University of Utah is not yet available via the EAC website.)
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Two volunteers independently recorded the vote on the audit reporting form. They ensured that
every ballot page on which the selected race was presented was reflected by a record in one of
the four categories listed on the audit report form. After approximately every 20 ballot pages,
the recording process paused so the two recorders could compare their tallies. By proceeding in
this manner, if tallies did not match, the team only had to review the last 20 ballots to find the
recording discrepancy rather than a full deck of ballots. Once all the votes in the race were
recorded for all ballots for the precinct, the recorders independently tallied the results on each
form. They then placed the results at the bottom of the form and compared them to each other to
ensure that the grand total for each candidate in that precinct matched across the sheets.
This hand count data was later entered into a CSU computer database and then the computer data
was checked for data entry mistakes. The hand count results were then compared to electronic
files provided by the CCBOE. 23 These files are discussed in more detail below.

D.

Findings

We were able to audit (via our procedures for hand counting) all 72 precincts in our random
sample of early absentee ballots. The ballots from two of the precincts (Cleveland 13-O and 17K) could not be located during our first round of audits (December 6 – 8, but Ballot Department
employees were able to track them down for our follow-up visit on December 29. Upon
investigation, it turned out that these missing ballots had not been filed in the correct envelopes
but by looking at batch numbers, the Ballot Department was able to figure out with which
precinct they had been scanned and accidentally misfiled. This misfiling would not have
affected the GEMS tally because each ballot page is computer-coded with the precinct’s
identifier.
After the original on-site audit activities and the first follow-up, a comparison of the hand count
audit data with the GEMS tabulation report showed the hand count results were consistent with
the GEMS precinct counts for 43 of the 79 precincts. Most of the 29 tallies inconsistent with the
GEMS report differed by only plus or minus one vote. One precinct showed one more vote for
Taylor and one less for Sykes than the GEMS report. One precinct, however, contained 60
ballots in its folder while the GEMS report showed zero ballots had been tabulated for that
precinct. These differences are documented in four groups in Appendix 9.
Discrepancy Evaluation: Off by One or Two Votes Possible explanations or causes of the
discrepancies of a few ballots include (1) errors in counting by audit volunteers during the hand
count; and (2) incomplete or inaccurate sorting of ballots prior to scanning resulting in ballots
from another precinct being present in the folder that was audited and/or ballots from the audited
precinct being misfiled in a different precinct folder.
Regarding Possible Explanation 1
During the original audit, each team had two observers who examined the ballot pages
before calling out the voter’s choice, and their observations were independently recorded
by two other volunteers who then reconciled their results at several interim steps as
23

For the purpose of the optical scan audit a file labeled "GEMS SOVC REPORT Unofficial AVOS Only.pdf" was
used based on guidance from the Ballot Department managers (see Appendix 13 and Part IV of this Audit Report).
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described in the procedure section above. Additionally, at a subsequent return visit to the
CCBOE, 11 of these 29 discrepant precincts were re-counted. No errors in the hand
count were detected.
Regarding Possible Explanation 2
The central count tabulation report for the unofficial count was made available by the
Ballot Department. This report shows each group or “batch” of optical scan ballots and
shows the number of ballot “cards” (pages) in each batch and to which precinct each
ballot “card” was assigned. Close examination of this report showed that the ballot pages
of 307 precincts were filed in more than one batch, and that 201 batches contained ballot
pages from more than only one precinct. It was also noted that in the Central Count
Report, 12 precincts showed no ballots had been counted and no votes had been recorded.
Auditors returned to examine these discrepancies on February 16 (see Appendix 10 for
complete description). Eleven of the precincts with fewer ballots in the hand count than
reported by GEMS were found to have misfiled ballot pages, scanned in with a different
precinct. Five of the precincts with fewer hand counted ballots could not be explained by
misfiling. Of the 11 precincts in our sample with a higher hand-count than the GEMS report,
three were found to be filing errors in which another precinct’s ballots were included in the
wrong precinct deck and the auditors mistakenly included them in their hand count.
The remaining eight discrepancies could not be explained by filing or hand-count errors. The
hand count for the precinct with one higher vote and one lower vote for the two candidates
was rechecked and found to be accurate. No explanation for the discrepancy with the GEMS
report could be found for this precinct.
Discrepancy Evaluation: Precincts with No Votes Recorded in the GEMS Report
The finding of greatest concern was the precinct, North Olmsted 2-F, which was found to
have ballots in the precinct folder but no results reflected in the GEMS election results. This
precinct was also one of the 12 that did not show any ballots counted in the Central Count
Scanning Report. Auditors returned to examine all 12 of these precincts (expanding beyond
the original sample) to see how common this problem was.
The CCBOE apparently received no early absentee ballots for eight of these 12 precincts that
recorded no ballots counted. Four precincts were found, however, where it appears likely
that all or nearly all of their early absentee ballots were not included in the unofficial SOVC
Report 24 (see Appendix 11 for a complete description).
Auditors were able to physically examine the ballots and envelopes of three of these four
precincts where the GEMS election results showed no early absentee ballots had been tallied.
In our view, it appears that these precincts’ ballots were scanned but then deleted from the
GEMS tally (see Appendix 12 for the CCBOE’s explanation of the omission). The precinct
folders the auditors examined contained ballots in numbers corresponding to the number of
24

The SOVC Report is the comprehensive Statement of Votes Cast Report from GEMS. It can show, precinct by
precinct, the total votes cast for every candidate and ballot issue and thus is quite lengthy unless a selected portion is
requested for printing.
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early absentee ballots that the CCBOE staff in the Candidate and Voter Services Department
had recorded as returned in time for early scanning.
The CCBOE procedure during the early scanning for the unofficial count required
verification by the ballot tabulation staff that the number of ballot pages GEMS reported as
having been scanned was within a certain margin of error of the number of pages reported by
the scanner. If not within that predetermined margin of error, the tabulation staff was
supposed to delete the precinct batch result from the GEMS tabulation. They were then to
send word to the scanning room with 60 teams of scanning personnel that the deleted deck
was to be rescanned. In these cases, it is possible that after deleting the precinct batch from
GEMS, the ballots were not rescanned but simply refiled in the envelope. Two precincts
each showed one vote in GEMS because there was a single ballot card for each of those
precincts present in a deck that consisted of only the single card.
Discrepancy Evaluation: Ballot Decks Scanned Multiple Times While comparing the
SOVC electronic file with the reported numbers of absentee ballots returned, it was also
noted that for at least two precincts (not originally included in our sample) it appeared that
there were significantly more votes recorded than were absentee ballots. Specifically:
North Royalton 3C
Euclid -02-J

770 voters
896 voters

52 abs returned
73 abs returned

118 SOVC
142 SOVC

Examination of the Central Count GEMS report for these precincts shows each to have had 2
batches of identical or near identical size with sequential or near-sequential numbers. When
we examined these precincts’ folders, there were ballots present in the folders in numbers
consistent with the number of absentee ballots reported returned. These observations are all
consistent with an explanation that the ballots in these two precincts’ folder were scanned
twice and that the votes on each ballot had been included in the SOVC election results twice.
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E. Conclusions
From the limited scope of this audit, which examined the results of one race as recorded on early
absentee optical scan ballots that were part of the unofficial count, we may conclude the
following:
Conclusion 1
Election result data in the GEMS report corresponded closely to the results obtained by
the audit hand count of the optical scan ballots
Audit results either matched exactly or were discrepant in a manner and degree consistent
with the number of ballot pages misfiled for 57 of the 72 precincts included in the audit.
Fourteen of the 15 precincts that did not exactly match were discrepant by plus or minus one
vote with an aggregate of one more vote for Sykes and three more for Taylor found by the
audit. This is a low net error rate out of a total of 3628 votes. The one other discrepant
precinct was not reported in the unofficial SOVC at all and represents an apparent scanning
procedural error.
Conclusion 2
The sorting process for early absentee optical scan ballots into precinct batches prior to
scanning was neither complete nor accurate.
A total of 1,768 “decks” 25 were created in which the early absentee ballots from the 1,434
precincts in Cuyahoga County were placed. Of these 1,768 decks, 201 contained ballots
from more than one precinct. The election reports also show some ballot pages of 307
precincts were separated (possibly misfiled) into more than one folder.
Prior to commencing the scanning of the early absentee ballots, the CCBOE staff hand sorted
a total of 66,228 absentee ballots into precinct decks. We were able to identify patterns of
misfiling: often the ballots were misfiled into precincts where extremely similar precincts
codes to the correct code were used. These codes often differed by only one character. This
pre-sorting was necessitated by concerns about the GEMS database’s limitations and its
stability over the period of uploading optically scanned ballots. Although the sorting was
imperfect, without it we would not have been able to conduct this audit and compression of
the GEMS database—and its consequent risks -- would have had to occur much more often.
Conclusion 3
Some discrepancies that occur at a very low frequency appear to be caused by a
scanner misreading of some of the optical scan ballots.

25

A “deck” is the electronic representation of a batch of ballots that were to be scanned together. The scanner
sends the accumulated results of the ballot up to the GEMS computer as one deck tally. This deck approach is in
lieu of scanning 55 ballots separately and sending 55 separate vote tallies up to GEMS. By using sizable decks, the
GEMS database does not grow as fast as having more decks with fewer ballots in each.
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In several of the discrepant precincts, the correct number of ballots was identified in the
initial audit and in a subsequent follow-up visit. However, the GEMS reported results
differed in a pattern suggesting that one or more ballots that the auditors considered to have
been clearly marked in either blue or black ink had not been accurately read or recorded by
the scanners/GEMS. In these cases, one fewer vote would be reported in the GEMS data file.
Conclusion 4
Some ballots were apparently scanned at some point but were not included in the
GEMS results or on the SOVC election results report.
At least four precincts for which early absentee ballots had been returned showed no votes
recorded in the unofficial election result tabulations. In at least three cases, it appeared from
the ballot folder documentation that ballots had been scanned and must have been deleted but
not rescanned.
Conclusion 5
Some ballot batches were scanned twice with their votes double-counted when the
GEMS unofficial results and the SOVC election results report is analyzed.
The ballots in at least two precinct folders appear to have been scanned twice. The numbers
of optical scan ballots present in the folder was consistent with the number of absentees
returned while the results reported in the election result tabulation for these precincts were
approximately doubled.
Conclusion 6
Batch/deck numbers identifying specific groups of ballots may change within the
scanning process and between scanning events.
The deck/batch identification is arbitrarily assigned by the “header card” that is placed at the
front of a stack of optical scan ballots prior to their being scanned. As reflected above, a
batch can be rescanned with a different header card. Similarly, some of these ballot batches
were given different digital batch identities when they were re-scanned for the official count.
The change in ballot batch identifiers greatly impeded the accurate tracking of batches so that
they could be confirmed as having been counted, and counted only once in the election
tabulation.

F. Recommendations for CCBOE Action
Recommendation 1
Hand sorting into precinct batches should be replaced by an automated system.
If the CCBOE has a continuing need to sort received absentee ballots into precinct-based
groups, this process should be automated. All of the absentee ballots originate with the
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CCBOE and are machine addressed. Automated sorting of the returned ballots could be done
by a commercial mail handler using a barcode placed by the CCBOE at the time of
addressing the mail to the voter.
Recommendation 2
The labeling or identity of a batch (and its electronic representation as a “deck”) should
be unique and constant.
Each deck of ballots should have a unique and immutable identity code, and ballots should
not float between decks. If the CCBOE continues to sort by precinct, this could be a
precinct-based code. Such a system would enable tracking and accounting for all ballots
received. It would also facilitate an audit of the performance of the optical scanning system.
Recommendation 3
A mechanism should be developed to record and track specific batches of ballots.
Each uniquely identified deck of ballots should be scanned and included in the election
results one time and only one time. Possible approaches to such a system include a precinctbased system that counts and reports the number of absentee ballots received by the CCBOE
as the precinct bar code is read on the intake sort. A system that uniquely identifies ballot
decks, prevents the double counting of ballot decks, and has the ability to flag missing decks
would be a major improvement over the uncontrolled situation that now exists.
Recommendation 4
The process of deleting ballot batches must have greater quality control to ensure rescanning of the deck.
Deletion of ballot batches means a large number of ballots are not recorded in the tabulation
unless rescanned. The CCBOE did not use the paper and ink log to record events such as
this, and there was deficient quality control and procedural verification over whether deleted
batches were re-scanned. Improving the quality control over the scanning procedure is the
best solution. However, an easy interim step is to perform a reasonableness test to determine
whether all optical scan ballots in a precinct were scanned and scanned only once. This test
would compare the number of returned absentee ballots multiplied by the average number of
sheets per ballot to the total number of scanned sheets. While these totals will not match
exactly because of variation in the number of sheets per ballot, a large discrepancy would
indicate either deleted or double-counted decks of ballots.
Recommendation 5
An audit similar to this, comparing electronically recorded optical scan results to those
obtained by hand counted examination of the optical scan ballots, should be performed
after every election and before certification.
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In general, the results of the counts corresponded closely in this audit. There was, however, a
very low frequency of lower votes recorded by the electronic system. There is no reason to
expect this to bias a race vote count but it does suggest that further verification of the
accuracy and completeness of the optical scanning system under real world conditions is
needed.

IV.

Security, Accuracy, and Sufficiency of the Data Needed for Auditing

When the Collaborative Audit Committee began its work, the presumption was that the
tabulation data from the central tabulation computer (GEMS server) would be easily identifiable
and readily made available to the Audit committee or Center for Election Integrity/Monitor staff
engaged in audit work. This proved not to be the case.

A. GEMS Election Results: Tabulation Files and Reports
To conduct the audit, the Center’s professional staff specified certain files in generic terms in
writing. We received confirmation that the ballot department would be providing the files
needed for the DRE audit immediately upon the closing of the unofficial tabulation on
November 8. Although the Center went out of its way to have staff present throughout the 36
hour Election Day and Night to take possession of the GEMS reports needed and was present
when the election closed early Wednesday afternoon, November 8, the data that the ballot
department supplied did not satisfy the specifications and did not permit the audit to
proceed.
The Center staff then undertook a series of conversations with CCBOE Director Michael Vu
and with Diebold's technician Chris Bellis about how GEMS produces data and the types of
files and reports that are possible after the election has closed. We then drew up a new list of
the data files that were needed for the audit. If the information that we were given is correct,
no single GEMS report is available that has exactly what is needed for both audits (absentee
ballots and DREs). We discovered that a series of analytic steps using several types of
election reports was required in order to obtain the data necessary to complete the audit.
Based on the information that we were able to obtain from the ballot department and the
Diebold representative, we list in the accompanying footnote the data we required to
complete the audit. 26 Despite our effort to pin down the exact data required and to ensure
26

The electronic files or reports we apparently needed for this audit:
a. GEMS Statement of Votes Cast (SOVC) Report run on the database backup after absentee ballots were
tabulated, but BEFORE DRE memory cards were uploaded.
b. Database file after absentee ballots were uploaded, but before GEMS tabulation was performed.
c. GEMS data export after absentee ballots were uploaded, but before GEMS tabulation was performed.
d. Database file after DRE uploading was complete.
e. GEMS data export after DRE uploading was complete.
f. GEMS SOVC Report after all absentee ballots performed on DREs.
g. Need the database file after all absentee ballots performed on DREs were uploaded.
h. GEMS data export after all absentee ballots performed on DREs were uploaded.
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that we obtained the requisite files immediately after the election’s unofficial count closed,
we were unable to do so. The Ballot Department manager advised that the files turned over
on November 8 included all that we had requested and needed, even though they did not.

B. Reliability and Accuracy of the Data from the GEMS Computer
Inconsistent absentee ballot results files. For the absentee ballot audit, the ballot department
provided several different electronic files that should have had the same data but actually
reported different election results. It is unclear to us, and apparently to the CCBOE as well,
why these election results files differ (see Appendix 13). We have no independent
knowledge of which results file should be used or why GEMS generates a variety of files
with varying election totals. What is clear to us, however, is that it is critical for the ballot
department to have accurate information on which file contains the actual total election
results. It is also essential information for determining the degree of fidelity the audit handcount has to the electronically produced election results.
Raw election data and database review. The Monitor software engineers sought to review
the raw election data to compare it with the GEMS-reported results to determine if there were
any errors in the GEMS tabulation. 27 Additionally, certain tabulation events (i.e., server
crashing during scanning operations; freezing of the database during a backup and
compression operation) occurred during the unofficial count that raised the possibility of
database corruption.
The CCBOE Director initially would not permit the raw election data to be provided to the
Audit committee or to the Monitor. He said Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI) would
assert trade secret or other protection of this data as proprietary. We challenged the legal
basis for any such claim. 28 Eventually, a limited database review was conducted by Monitor
software engineers with a DESI representative present and several CCBOE ballot and
information services managers. Focusing on only three of the November races, the lead
engineer showed the observers that for each of the three, GEMS maintained two separate
election results tables that held values that were inconsistent with one another. The results
differed between the two tables by over 100 votes for each of the three races checked.

27

Joe Hall of the UC Berkeley School of Information provided significant consultation as the Monitor prepared for
this database review and served as a sounding board for other technical questions.
28
We find that the decision in Assessment Technologies v. Wiredata, 350 F. 3d 640 (2003) (Posner, J.) (concerning
real estate tax assessment data) persuasively demonstrates that the election voting data would be beyond propriety
control if urged to be protected by copyright law. We thank Professor Mike Madison of the University of Pittsburgh
Law School for bringing this case to our attention. For a discussion of trade secret claims asserted by voting system
vendors and possible challenges to those claims, see: Aaron Burstein, Stephen Dang, Galen Hancock and Jack
Lerner, "Legal Issues Facing Election Officials in an Electronic-Voting World", Samuelson Law, Technology and
Public Policy Clinic at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), available at:
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/samuelson/projects_papers/Legal_Issues_Elections_Officials_FINAL.pdf

35

Collaborative Public Audit for Cuyahoga County (2006 General Election)

We filed a written query with DESI, and received a response that we find raises more
questions (see Appendix 14). In brief, the GEMS software engineer said that the tables are
updated at different points and that this does not matter to the final results. This explanation
did little to alleviate our concerns. Additionally, we have no clarity on which table contains
the final accurate results.
The Monitor’s software engineers conducting the review also found other strong indicators of
possible database corruption, including blank fields. (See Appendix 16 for a memo on other
database corruption indicators). Microsoft's JET engine, which DESI used to communicate
with the vote tally database, is documented to have a problem with unpreventable database
corruption. 29 (See Appendix 17 for excerpts from a Microsoft publication concerning
security and corruption issues in the JET platform.)

ÆAn in-depth Monitor’s Report on technical and database issues is forthcoming.

C. Hardware and Software Design Impediments to Auditing
Hardware design issues: The current generation of major brand optical scanners, including
those used in Cuyahoga County, do not count ballots but only ballot pages. In Cuyahoga’s
General Election in November 2006, among the 59 separate jurisdictions, optical scan ballots
could vary in length by several pages. Also, voters did not always return every page of the
ballot when they sent it in. Thus, even if we know the total number of optical scan ballots
that the CCBOE received for tabulation, we have no easy way to determine whether all the
ballots were part of the tabulation. To determine whether all the ballots had been counted,
the CCBOE executives simply averaged the number of ballot pages and estimated that all the
optical scan ballots had been counted.
This design problem also impedes the ability to produce accurate undervote rates (in specific
races or ballot issues).
By contrast, with punch cards the CCBOE was able to determine with complete accuracy
whether all the ballots that had been received had been counted. The current generation
optical scan hardware (and firmware) design, however, does not include features that are
essential to determining whether all ballots are counted. As a result of new, apparently
HAVA-compliant 30 equipment, we have reduced rather than increased the accuracy and
reliability of our elections results. This reduction in reliability is apparently due to an
engineering design omission, one that must be redressed either by a hardware change or
expensive auditing procedures.
Software Design Issues The GEMS system currently does not report election data at the
DRE unit level of specificity. The lowest level of reporting is for the precinct. This means
that the accuracy of particular DRE machines cannot be determined via an audit.

29

How to Troubleshoot and to Repair a Damaged Access 2002 or Later Database, (Rev. 6.1 2006) at
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;283849.
30
The Help America Vote Act, 42 USC SS 15301-15545.
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D. Security: Logging and Data Systems in the CCBOE
As stated in the Monitor’s Report on Possible Legal Noncompliance (January 8, 2007), 31 the
Ballot and Information Services Departments have failed to implement crucial Security
Policy provisions that are designed to protect the tabulation server and the integrity of the
election results. The paper and ink logs that were to be used to record deleted ballot batches
and server events were largely unutilized, in violation of the Security Policy, and probably
one of the key reasons for the inability to track deleted batches to assure their re-scanning.

E.

Recommendations for CCBOE Action

1. Obtain independent guidance (to supplement and compare that from DESI) on what
electronic files should be used for each type of election auditing, and how the files differ
from one another.
2. To permit accurate election audits to be conducted, the Secretary of State should specify
the data that must be kept and for what period of time.
3. The CCBOE Board should authorize the Monitor to ascertain whether the security policy
has been fully implemented and to provide recommendations for how to achieve full
compliance before the next election.
4. A citizen’s advisory board of up to five qualified individuals should be created to focus
on technical and security issues. Its first task, in conjunction with the Monitor, should be
to review, rewrite, and improve the CCBOE Security Policy.
5. The CCBOE should request an independent evaluation of the GEMS database from a
qualified consultant. The task should be to ascertain whether database corruption
occurred in the November 2006 election. Secondly, the consultant should make
recommendations on how to avoid database corruption to the maximum extent feasible
and what steps should be taken to protect election data as tabulations are occurring.

V.

TOP TIER RECOMMENDATIONS for SYSTEMIC IMPROVEMENT

This report covers many audit findings in great detail but it is by necessity limited in scope.
Budget, timing, and legal and administrative impediments narrowed the scope of the two audits
to such a degree that they do not provide a comprehensive view of how Cuyahoga County’s
overall election system is functioning. While we believe our findings are extremely important
and merit strong consideration by the CCBOE, they are not a stopping point. They are a first
step in providing public oversight of the electoral system.

31

The Public Monitor Report on Possible Legal Noncompliance (dated Jan. 8, 2007) can be found at
www.csuohio.edu/cei/.
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1. Independent random audits should be a routine part of the election process.
Auditing is standard business practice and should be applied to our voting systems because of
their importance. There is clear evidence that problems exist:
•
•
•
•

This Collaborative Public Audit has discovered problems with DRE Long Reports and the
Optical Scan counting process;
As reported in the Cleveland Plain Dealer in November 2006, thousands of people voted
without having signed in at the polling place;
Two CCBOE employees were convicted for performing illegal actions during the 2004
recount; and
The ESI audit and Cuyahoga Election Review Panel assessments after the May 2006 election
found numerous problems (e.g., 9.6% of paper audit trails, including the legal ballots, were
defective or compromised the audit).

A reasonable approach might be to perform an independent audit after each major election and a
collaborative internal audit after smaller local elections. The time and cost involved do not need
to be exorbitant and will decrease as problems are resolved and process controls are put in place.
A periodic professional independent audit could help identify needed improvements and restore
voter confidence in the system. Future election audits should include evaluations of the
following issues so that internal administrative and technical systems may be improved where
needed:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Electronic voting & legal ballots (e.g., do the paper ballots/VVPATs match the electronic
counts?)
Chain of custody of election materials (e.g., were security procedures followed?)
Provisional ballot procedures (e.g., Did the right people cast these ballots? How many voters
lost their vote because they were at right polling location, but were not directed to the correct
precinct?)
Optical Scan/Absentee ballots (e.g., were all the ballots counted? Were they counted
accurately? Were any ballots counted more than once?)
Security Plan (e.g., was the plan complete? Was the plan implemented?)
Internal Controls (e.g., were important internal processes documented? Were those
procedures followed?)

In addition to implementing a routine comprehensive professional audit, the Collaborative Audit
Committee believes the current system, which relies upon two voting systems, should be
seriously reviewed.
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2. Reconsider the feasibility and wisdom of supporting two major voting systems –Optical
Scan and DREs.
The problems found in this audit, the ESI audit, and report from the Cuyahoga Election Review
Panel 32 call into question whether it is practical and cost effective for Cuyahoga County
to support two voting machine systems (i.e., electronic and optical scan). Some factors to be
considered include:
•

Election Costs for 2006 went well beyond the budget. Some costs were one time costs, but
a significant amount of the overrun was for enhanced training to help prepare poll workers
and Election Day Technicians (EDTs) for an increasingly complicated job. These costs
probably will not go away because we cannot assume that these workers will return and
remember the complex instructions that they were taught a year ago.

•

It is unclear if DRE electronic voting can support the turnout in a Presidential election.
Despite a large increase in absentee voting for November 2006, a federal judge ordered 16
polling places to be kept open after the normal closing time of 7:30 PM because of reported
wait times exceeding one hour. The voting turnout in a presidential year is substantially
higher than a mid-term election. What planning has occurred to avoid problems with lines in
2008? Have options other than purchasing more DRE units been considered for dealing with
the expected spike in turnout?

•

CCBOE staff must be hired and trained to support both systems. Hardware needs to be
set up, poll worker manuals need to be provided, poll worker and professional staff training
must be planned and executed, and different types of ballots and pre-election and postelection testing must be prepared and executed. All of this needs to be done for two systems
instead of one. Does the CCBOE have the resources (including managerial and financial) to
achieve success with two systems?

•

The DREs present considerably more hurdles to complete auditing than do optical
scanning systems. The problems with the DRE printers causing damaged Long Reports, and
the difficulties in locating data printed in a miniscule typeface on a narrow register-receipt
that can be over 20 feet long, are only two impediments to DRE auditing.

If the CCBOE claims that continuing to use two voting systems is the best solution, the burden of
proof should on the CCBOE to show:
•
•

That they will resolve the problems reported in the CERP report, the ESI audit, and January
8, 2007 Monitor memo from the Center For Election Integrity;
That they have or will hire the managers and staff necessary to resolve the problems caused
by staff shortages; and

32

The Cuyahoga Election Review Panel’s Final Report can be found at www.csuohio.edu/cei/ (dated July 20,
2006). This webpage provides the option of reading or downloading the panel report in separate chapters rather than
in its entirety of 400 pages (including appendices).
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•

The difference between maintaining two voting systems (including poll worker training,
vendor support costs, and CCBOE staff headcount and expenses) and a single optical scan
voting system is a defensible cost.

3. Undertake a GEMS election results Database Integrity and Reliability Evaluation
The Diebold Corporation used a Microsoft database “engine” (JET) as the foundation for its
GEMS software. Microsoft has posted warnings that database corruption cannot be completely
prevented in this “engine.” Microsoft also warned that JET was inappropriate for use where
there were high needs for data accuracy and security. (See Appendix 17) The risk factors for
GEMS data integrity can be identified. The CCBOE should examine, using a qualified expert,
the integrity of the November 2006 GEMS database and solicit recommendations for minimizing
the risks to the accuracy and integrity of election tabulations.
4. Evaluate the Voter Registration Software System
While analyzing the feasibility of supporting two voting systems, we also recommend an
assessment of the DIMS voter registration system. While not part of this audit, DIMS was
repeatedly mentioned by both internal CCBOE staff and external observers as a weak link within
the electoral system. Both the January 8, 2007 Public Monitor Report on Possible Legal
Noncompliance and the December 7, 2006 memo from Tom Hayes of the LNE group (serving as
the CCBOE’s Program Manager) to the Cuyahoga County Commissioners 33 describe a number
of problems with DIMS including: lost voter records due to overwriting, corrupted poll worker
applicant information, inconsistencies in the voter history record, and lost productivity due to the
need to reboot the system several times each day. The CERP Final Report 34 devoted almost an
entire chapter to the DIMS voter registration database problems but reportedly no investigation
has ever been conducted. The range of problems has increased. A technical evaluation to
identify the design and operational problems, and any “glitches,” is warranted so that the
problems can be fixed or the system replaced. Maintaining an arguably defective voter
registration database may present legal liability for the CCBOE as well.

***
This Collaborative Audit Committee appreciates the authorization to conduct this audit and
would look forward to working with the CCBOE’s new managerial and Board Member team to
improve election verification and other internal controls.

33

Memo from Tom Hayes, LNE Group to the Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissioners (December 7,
2006), p 1.
34
CERP Final Report, see www.csuohio.edu/cei/ at chapter 1-2.
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Appendix 1

Background on the Cuyahoga Collaborative Public Audit:
Creation, Purposes, Authority, and Participants in the
Collaborative Public Audit

I. The Need to Achieve Independent Verification of Election Results
Achieving accuracy in reported election results is the primary objective for any quality
election administration. Given the range of recent information reported nationally about
possible problems with e-voting technologies, and also some of the problems the Cuyahoga
County Board of Election (BOE) experienced in prior elections, election reform
organizations and the major political parties sought to have the local election results
independently verified as accurate reflections of the ballots cast in the November 2006
election. In early fall, the chief initial public concerns focused on the DRE touchscreen
voting devices which were to be used at polling places on election day.
After discussions with election reform organizations about their concerns, the Public Monitor
of Cuyahoga Election Reform 1 introduced at a public Board meeting a proposal for a
Collaborative Public Audit. The proposal pledged that the Monitor would seek the
cooperative involvement of the local Democratic and Republican Parties, plus several
election reform organizations to conduct the independent audit. The audit, per the reform
organizations’ requests, was to focus on the Diebold DRE touchscreen voting machines. The
DRE units are the primary technology used in Cuyahoga County for Election Day voting at
the polling locations. The DRE units are also used in “walk-in” absentee voting. 2
The BOE Board Members unanimously approved the DRE audit proposal (and one other
presented in the same verification proposa) on October 2, 2006, noting that some flexibility
might be needed and that the Board’s attorney needed to approve its legality. Thereafter, the
county political parties’ chairmen (Republican and Democratic) requested that the audit be
extended to include optically scanned absentee ballots. The Audit Committee, which had
been formed and begun working, agreed to this extension. The CCBOE Board Members
unanimously approved the extension as well.
The Collaborative Audit participants believe the public wants independent verification that
the election results that the e-voting technology has generated are accurate. Additionally,
they believe both the election administrative staff and the public at large need to know
whether the voting machines’ programming maintained its integrity after the machines
passed the pre-election testing and were deployed to the polling locations for Election Day.
Reliable information on these and other questions are crucial so that sound decisions can be
1

The Center for Election Integrity of Cleveland State University per a proposal and testimony prepared by its
Director, Candice Hoke.
2
Functionally, “walk-in” absentee voting is a form of early voting.
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made as to the voting and database technologies we used and so that any corrections in
administrative or other systems that are needed can be identified. While the audits that were
conducted are limited rather than comprehensive and conclusive on these points, the
information acquired is useful on these and other issues.
A national Election Audit Workgroup teaming the Brennan Center with with the Samuelson
Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic at Boalt Hall School of Law (UC Berkeley), as well
as several election officials and leading academics as been working to evaluate current audit
laws and procedures and provide critical analysis to public officials as they begin to adopt
audit schemes and procedures. The workgroup has thus far identified five core goals that
should motivate the design of election auditing: increasing public confidence in the results of
an election; deterring fraud against the voting system; detecting large-scale systemic errors;
providing feedback that will allow jurisdictions to improve elections and machinery in future
years, and confirming to a high level of confidence that a 100% manual recount would not
change the outcome of the race.
We agree strongly with this statement of election auditing design goals but would add a
sixth: providing additional incentives for the staff to reach higher standards of accuracy. In
order to achieve these six and other auditing goals, we have concluded, as has the Election
Audit Workgroup, that the independence of the auditing entity is essential. 3
The Collaborative Audit Committee commends the Cuyahoga Board of Election for taking
this Ohio leadership role in initiating election auditing and thus creating an independent
mechanism for verifying the announced election results. We would also like to thank the
over forty volunteers that gave their time over numerous days to help conduct this audit.
Without this huge volunteer effort, this audit would not have been possible.

Policy Formation, Structure, and Participating Entities
The participating organizations that exercised policymaking powers over the audit and
solicited volunteers were:
•
•
•
•
•

Democratic Party of Cuyahoga County
Republican Party of Cuyahoga County
League of Women Voters
CASE-Ohio (Citizens’ Alliance for Secure Elections)
Greater Cleveland Voter Coalition

3

Lawrence D. Norden, Statement to the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration,
Subcommittee on Elections, March 20, 2007 at 2; Candice Hoke, Statement to the U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, March 20, 2007 at 2 (this testimony to the
Subcommittee on Elections that held hearings on Federal Election Auditing can be found at
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6445).
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The Center for Election Integrity at CSU, in its role as Public Monitor for Cuyahoga County
Board of Elections, served as the coordinator of the audit process. Center staff undertook a
great deal of auditing duties but proposed the audit structure so that it acted as a neutral
facilitator rather than a policymaker with a vote in Collaborative Audit group decisions. The
Center for Election Integrity supplied professional staff services. Assistant Director Abigail
Horn led the Center’s audit work.
The policy decisions governing the audit, including which races to audit, were made by the
representatives of the participating policymaking organizations.
Each participating
organization was limited to a maximum of two representatives on the planning and
policymaking Audit Committee. The political parties sent experienced professional auditors
and lawyers. The election reform organizations supplied individuals with a wide range of
election expertise, including software engineers with technical voting technology expertise
and poll workers or election observers. Virtually all decisions were made by consensus.
CSU’s Northern Ohio Data Information Service (NODIS),4 directed by Dr. Mark Salling
designed the sample and audit methodology and provided analysis of the results.

4

http://nodisnet1.csuohio.edu/nodis/index.shtml
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Appendix 2

Methodology and Procedures to Select Sample for Cuyahoga County Election
Audit of DRE Long Reports versus GEMS Tabulations
Prepared by
Ellen Cyran and Mark Salling
Northern Ohio Data and Information Service
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs
Cleveland State University
December 28, 2006
This report describes the methodology used to select the sample of precincts used in the audit of
the printed long reports produced from the electronic voting machines (DRE) immediately after
the polls close on Election Day. 5 This audit is to verify the accuracy of the long reports against
the published output of GEMS tabulation system that is produced after loading data from each of
the memory cards used by the DREs. 6
To insure that any discrepancy found is unlikely to affect the outcome of an election, the sample
size is based on the closest race among those selected for inclusion by the collaborative audit
group. The audit group selected county or statewide races with each political party selecting a
race and civic groups selecting the third race. The unofficial election results, which included
electronic voting machines (DRE) at the polling locations and early absentee optical scanned
ballots, were used to determine the closest race. If the race was a statewide race, then the margin
between the candidates at the state level was used in addition to the county level to determine the
closeness of the race.
The steps involved in determining the sample size are as follows.
1. Calculate the percentage vote margin between the top two candidates of the closest race.
In this case, the three selected races had only two candidates each.
2. Since the closest race was a statewide race and the statewide percent winning margin was
less than the county-wide margin, the statewide margin percentage was used. The
resulting margin was 2.1 percent of the votes cast for that race (state auditor).
3. Apply the state percentage vote margin (2.1%) to the votes in the county for the selected
race, divide by two, and add one to obtain the votes needed to change the winner of the
race. This provides the number of votes in the county that need to be switched in order to
change the outcome of the race, assuming that the percentage margin is applied uniformly
statewide.
4. Assume a maximum vote shift of 15 percent between the leading candidate and all other
candidates in any precinct. (The Brennan Center recommends 7.5 percent for polling
5

Multiple DREs may be (are often) used at each polling place to collect votes on one or more precincts.
This audit is performed since the long reports are available for audit soon after the election. The voter-verified
paper audit trail (VVPAT) is not available for the audit because Ohio state law bars access to it.

6
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5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

location sampling and 15 percent for voting unit sampling. 7 This value represents the
estimated maximum proportion of votes per polling location, precinct, or voting machine
that needs to be switched for a candidate in order to change the outcome of the race.)
Sort precincts by descending order of votes cast in the closest race using the unofficial
results reported from the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections tabulation server (based
on voting from the DREs at the polls and the early absentee results).
Calculate the vote shift per precinct:
a. Sort the precincts in descending order by votes cast in the closest race.
b. Apply the 15 percent vote shift rate to each precinct, rounding up to the nearest vote.
The 15 percent vote shift rate is from one candidate to another or 30 percent vote shift
margin.
c. If the winning candidate did not receive 15 percent of the votes in any given precinct,
then assign a zero vote shift for the precinct.
This would total to the necessary votes to change the election result (if applied uniformly
across the state).
Sum the vote shift amount among the precincts until reaching (or just exceeding) the
number calculated in step three; i.e., the number of votes necessary to change the
outcome. The count is the minimum number of corrupt votes to alter the election with a
2.1 percent margin difference. The number of precincts, which were required to obtain
the minimum number of corrupt votes, is the minimum number of corrupt precincts
required to alter the election.
Use a hypergeometric distribution to determine the probability P of selecting at least one
corrupt precinct in a sample of s precincts selected from a population of N precincts
containing b corrupt precincts. The formula is:
⎛ N − b⎞
⎜⎜
⎟
s ⎟⎠
⎝
P = 1−
⎛N⎞
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝s⎠
This formula must be solved for s with a computer program 8 or by estimation. A
computer program was used since it gives the most accurate result. The formula was
solved to determine the number of precincts that must be audited to insure 95 percent and
99 percent confidence interval levels.
a. The 99 percent confidence intervals requires 110 precincts
b. The 95 percent confidence intervals requires 72 precincts;
Add 20 percent to the sample size to account for “long reports” that may not be available
or useable. Since the 99 percent confidence level was preferred, 22 secondary or “backup” precincts were added to the primary 110 precincts to be drawn in the sample. Thus,

7

The Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security, Lawrence Norden, Chair, The Machinery of
Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World, pg 22,
http://www.Brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_39288.pdf.
8
A Matlab program was converted to SAS to calculate the sample size, based on the minimum corrupt votes and the
number of corrupt precincts from step 7. The Matlab program is available from Dopp, Kathy and Stenger, Frank:
“The Election Integrity Audit,” National Election Data Archive Project, September 25, 2006,
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/ElectionIntegrityAudit.pdf.
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110 precincts are needed to achieve the objectives, though a total of 132 precincts are to
be drawn.
The following steps were then used to select the sample precincts.
10. Select a sampling seed. Single-digit numbers submitted by each member of the audit
collaborative were used to construct the seed.
11. Obtain the overall sample (soverall=132) with ‘proc surveyselect’ in SAS® 9 from the
population of N = 1,434 precincts.
12. Using the same seed as was used in the overall sample selection, obtain the primary
sample (sprimary = 110) with ‘proc surveyselect’ in SAS® from the overall sample of
useable forms (suseable), where suseable is expected to be between 110 and 132.
13. Sort the 110 primary sample precincts and the 22 secondary sample precincts separately
in descending order by votes cast in the largest precinct and polling location. This kept
selected precincts at the same polling place together in the listing to facilitate data
collection from the long reports. It also insured that the largest precincts were examined
first and included in the sample in the event that a complete sample could not be
implemented.

9

SAS®, http://www.sas.com.
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Appendix 3
Example of the Form for Recording DRE “Long Report” Data
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Appendix 4
Basic Statistics on DRE Long Report entries
General:
1. The complete sample contained 1,414 unique long reports. The BOE had 5,834 DREs to use
on Election Day (although it is unclear if they used them all). If all the available DREs were
used, our sample represented 24.2 percent of all long reports.
2. The complete sample contained 132 precincts in 121 polling locations. This represents 9.2
percent of all precincts in the county.
3. The precincts in the complete sample contained 32,062 total votes cast. This represents 8.9
percent of the total votes cast in the county (361,025).
4. In the long report sample, 246 unique long reports (some containing data for more than one
precinct in our sample) were not audited at all because those precincts/polling locations were
missing some long reports. Without a complete set of long reports for a given precinct, we
were unable to audit the existing long reports.
5. This leaves 1,168 unique long reports audited and used in the frequency counts. Some of
these long reports contained data for more than one precinct in our sample.
Race and total vote matches:
1. 95 precincts matched the GEMS Server for total votes casts and the six candidate total in the
three races.
2. Six precincts partially matched the GEMS Server data since the long reports were missing for
some of the races audited. The two listed below matched at least one complete race. The
other four precincts matched at least one candidate, but not a complete race.
•

Lakewood 3-E, polling location 5650-Westerly Apts. (Barton Ctr) matched in total, state
auditor and Supreme Court races. DRE SN 295434 had a tape jam so the results for
judicial race were missing for that DRE.

•

East Cleveland 3-D, 4810-Martin Luther King Civic Center matched only the judicial
race. DRE SN 254353 was blank for the other races.

3. 31 precincts did not match because of problems with long reports in those polling location.
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Appendix 5
Duplicate DRE Serial Numbers
1. Two duplicate DREs with different vote counts were found within polling locations.
DRE SN 278596 – Garfield Heights 1D, Polling location 8027-St. Timothy Manor
DRE SN 254886 – Middleburg Heights 4D Polling location 6100-Baptist Mid-Missions
None of the above duplicates were deleted from any reporting. The votes in both duplicate long
reports appears to have been loaded into the GEMS server since both are needed for the totals to
match the audit totals.
2. One duplicate DRE across polling locations was found.
DRE SN 260368 - Brook Park 1E, Polling location 1460-Brook Park Recreation Center
Cleveland 3Q, Polling location 2261-Church Of God Of Cleveland
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Appendix 6
2 DREs from the Same Precinct with the Same Serial Number:
Photocopies of Excerpts of 2 Long Reports
[note right column portion, “MACHINE SERIAL”)
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Appendix 7. All Unmatched Precincts
Id
1

First
Polling_Place_Name
Precinct_Name
Line
31 1460-BROOK PARK RECREATION CENTER
BROOK PARK -01-E
157 3980-CLEVELAND KOREAN PRESB. CHURCH CLEVELAND -16-P

Votes Cast Gallagher
-81

-34

Difference (Audit minus GEMS)
Hastings
Sykes
Taylor
-20

-49

O_Neill

-30

O_Donnell

-28

Partial Matches

-37 no
no

2

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Missing parts of long reports
Missing several long reports

158 3980-CLEVELAND KOREAN PRESB. CHURCH CLEVELAND -16-Q
3
4
5
6

Comments

189 5400-GATES MILLS COMMUNITY HOUSE
201 7220-ST. MARGARET MARY CHURCH HALL
225 1120-BEACHWOOD HIGH SCHOOL
295 6700-JOHN MUIR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

GATES MILLS -00-B
SOUTH EUCLID -01-C
BEACHWOOD -00-F
PARMA -04-A

308
458
464
516

BEDFORD HEIGHTS -03-C
MIDDLEBURG HEIGHTS -04-A
WARRENSVILLE HTS -07-B
STRONGSVILLE -02-I

1170-COLUMBUS INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL
6090-MIDDLEBURG HTS. CHURCH OF GOD
7830-ST. JUDE PARISH HALL
7580-HIGH POINT RECREATION CENTER

571 4990-OUR LADY OF LOURDES SHRINE
698 3012-ZION CHAPEL(MISS BAPT ANNEX)
718 6130-ST. WENCESLAS SCHOOL
719 6130-ST. WENCESLAS SCHOOL
773 3040-CUDELL RECREATION CENTER
796 5650-WESTERLY APTS. (BARTON CTR)
842 8024-FIFTH CHRISTIAN CHURCH

EUCLID -04-B
CLEVELAND -01-U
MAPLE HEIGHTS -04-C
MAPLE HEIGHTS -04-D
CLEVELAND -18-I
LAKEWOOD -03-E
CLEVELAND -01-B

916 2440-ST. MARTIN DEPORRES CENTER
936 5710-LINCOLN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
937 5710-LINCOLN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

CLEVELAND -09-K
LAKEWOOD -02-H
LAKEWOOD -02-I

980 4220-GLENVILLE HIGH SCHOOL
985 4860-TERRACE TOWERS
990 2265-BOYS & GIRLS CLUB OF CLEVELAND
1013 2420-CAPTAIN ARTHUR ROTH SCHOOL
1027 6535-SENIOR CITIZENS CENTER BLDG-G
1097 4500-SIMPSON UN'D METHODIST CHURCH
1107 4280-IMMACULATE HEART OF MARY
1153 6710-RIDGEBROOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

CLEVELAND -09-E
EAST CLEVELAND -04-E
CLEVELAND -03-L
CLEVELAND -09-F
OAKWOOD -05-A
CLEVELAND -18-R
CLEVELAND -12-D
PARMA -01-G

1194 2360-EVERLASTING BAPTIST CHURCH
1206 4810-MARTIN LUTHER KING CIVIC CENTER

CLEVELAND -10-J
EAST CLEVELAND -03-D

1328 6580-ORANGE VILLAGE HALL
1380 8018-PEARLBROOK CHURCH OF GOD
1419 2300-ALEXANDER G. BELL ELEM. SCHOOL
1527 2080-GREATER ABYSSINIA TOWERS
1546 4290-WESTSIDE SACHSENHEIM HALL
1547 4290-WESTSIDE SACHSENHEIM HALL

ORANGE -00-C
CLEVELAND -16-S
CLEVELAND -06-S
CLEVELAND -08-O
CLEVELAND -16-A
CLEVELAND -16-C

no

-17

-9

-2

-8

-7

-8

-3

0

-3

-2

-1

0

-277

-74

-100

-94

-137

-70

-1

-11

-24

0

-1

0

-24

-12

-1

-17

-2

-8

0
-2

-5
0

-2
-1

0
-2

0
0

0
0

-190
-6

-58
-2

-74
-1

-101
-6

-72
0

-79
-3

-189

-71

-47

-162

-8

-79

-83

-36

-12

-61

-14

-32

-37

-14

-17

-24

-9

-13

-17

0

0

-12

-2

-11

-11

-4

-13

-5

-4

-5

-58

-28

-12

-50

-3

-43

no
-7 no
no
-2 Partial, but not the
same race
no
-128 no
no
-1 Partial, but not the
same race
no
-9 no
no
no
no
0 Partial
-1 Partial, but not the
same race
no
-79 no
-3 Partial, but not the
same race
-71 no
no
no
no
-23 no
no
-19 no
no
no
-3 Partial
-5 no
no
-35 no
no
no
no

Missing several long reports
All long reports missing for this precinct
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing one long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
Torn long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
Printer jam couldn't read two races
precinct missing on long report
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing 1 long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
printer problems
Missing all long reports
Missing 1 long report
Missing several long reports
Missing 1/2 of a long report
Blank tape for auditor and supreme court
Missing 1 long report
Missing all long reports
Missing 1 long report
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports
Missing several long reports

Note: Those precincts with blanks (no differences recorded) did not have completed audits because long report problems were identified at the beginning and
auditors knew they would not have sufficient information to do a comparison with GEMS data.
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Appendix 8
Discrepancies between PDF and sum of CSV files for unofficial results
(128 precincts)
Difference - Unofficial PDF results minus combined CSV results

Precinct
BEACHWOOD -00-D
BEACHWOOD -00-H
BEACHWOOD -00-K
BEDFORD -01-A
BEDFORD -03-A
BEREA -02-A
BRECKSVILLE -00-E
BRECKSVILLE -00-L
BROOKLYN -00-A
BROOKLYN -00-C
BROOKLYN -00-F
BROOKLYN -00-G
BROOK PARK -01-A
BROOK PARK -01-B
BROOK PARK -01-C
BROOK PARK -02-A
BROOK PARK -02-C
BROOK PARK -04-A
CLEVELAND -01-D
CLEVELAND -01-F
CLEVELAND -01-N
CLEVELAND -01-P
CLEVELAND -02-A
CLEVELAND -02-I
CLEVELAND -02-S
CLEVELAND -03-B
CLEVELAND -03-R
CLEVELAND -05-J
CLEVELAND -05-L
CLEVELAND -05-M
CLEVELAND -05-N
CLEVELAND -05-R
CLEVELAND -08-E
CLEVELAND -08-R
CLEVELAND -09-F
CLEVELAND -09-G
CLEVELAND -09-J
CLEVELAND -09-K

Cards
Cast

Sykes

Taylor

Gallagher

Hastings

O'Donnell

O'Neill

1
1
1
1
3
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
1
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0

1
1
0
0
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
1
0
1
2
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0

1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
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CLEVELAND -10-M
CLEVELAND -10-Q
CLEVELAND -11-J
CLEVELAND -13-E
CLEVELAND -13-X
CLEVELAND -15-E
CLEVELAND -16-D
CLEVELAND -16-Q
CLEVELAND -16-R
CLEVELAND -17-G
CLEVELAND -18-D
CLEVELAND -19-C
CLEVELAND -19-D
CLEVELAND -20-A
CLEVELAND -20-N
CLEVELAND -21-A
CLEVELAND -21-G
CLEVELAND -21-P
CLEVELAND HEIGHTS 01-J
CLEVELAND HEIGHTS 04-D
EAST CLEVELAND -03-G
EUCLID -01-D
EUCLID -01-M
EUCLID -03-K
EUCLID -04-D
EUCLID -04-I
GARFIELD HEIGHTS -01E
GARFIELD HEIGHTS -02C
GARFIELD HEIGHTS -05C
INDEPENDENCE -00-A
INDEPENDENCE -00-G
INDEPENDENCE -00-H
LAKEWOOD -01-A
LAKEWOOD -01-L
LAKEWOOD -02-K
LAKEWOOD -04-D
LYNDHURST -02-D
LYNDHURST -03-A
LYNDHURST -04-E
MAPLE HEIGHTS -03-D
MAPLE HEIGHTS -04-A
MAPLE HEIGHTS -04-C
MAPLE HEIGHTS -07-C
MAYFIELD HEIGHTS -00B

1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
2
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1

1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1

0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
2
1

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

1
2
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
1
0
0
1
1

1
2
0
0
1
0
0

0
0
1
0
1
1
1

1
2
0
1
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
1

1
1
1
0
1
1
0

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1

1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0

0
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
2
0

0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0

1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
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MAYFIELD HEIGHTS -00F
MAYFIELD HEIGHTS -00M
MAYFIELD VILLAGE -01-A
MAYFIELD VILLAGE -03-A
MIDDLEBURG HEIGHTS 04-C
NEWBURGH HEIGHTS 00-A
NORTH OLMSTED -01-B
NORTH OLMSTED -02-D
NORTH OLMSTED -04-A
NORTH OLMSTED -04-G
NORTH OLMSTED -04-H
NORTH ROYALTON -03-A
NORTH ROYALTON -03-E
NORTH ROYALTON -05-C
OLMSTED TOWNSHIP 00-B
PARMA -01-C
PARMA -01-E
PARMA -02-A
PARMA -03-A
PARMA -03-J
PARMA -04-C
PARMA -05-D
PARMA -06-D
PARMA -07-G
PARMA -08-E
PARMA -09-E
PEPPER PIKE -00-B
PEPPER PIKE -00-D
PEPPER PIKE -00-F
ROCKY RIVER -02-F
ROCKY RIVER -03-B
SEVEN HILLS -01-C
SEVEN HILLS -03-C
SHAKER HEIGHTS -00-JJ
SOLON -01-C
SOLON -02-B
SOLON -03-C
SOUTH EUCLID -02-G
STRONGSVILLE -04-C
UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS 00-F
UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS 00-M
WESTLAKE -02-C
WESTLAKE -02-D

2

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

1
1
1

0
0
1

1
1
0

0
0
0

1
1
1

1
1
0

0
0
1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
2

0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1

1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1

0
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
1
1
2
0
1

1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0

0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
2
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1

0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
3
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0

2

2

0

1

1

0

2

1
1

0
1

0
0

0
1

0
0

0
1

0
0
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WESTLAKE -04-B
WESTLAKE -05-E
WESTLAKE -05-F
Total
Maximum difference
Minimum difference

1
1
1

1
0
0

0
1
1

0
1
0

1
0
0

0
1
0

1
0
0

152
5
1

91
5
0

42
2
0

58
2
0

50
2
0

48
2
0

72
3
0
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Appendix 9 Form (example) Used to Audit the Optical Scan Ballots
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Appendix 10
Discrepancies in Optical Scan Hand Count from GEMS report
Group A. The audit hand count results were lower than the GEMS reported count in these 16
precincts:
Beachwood 0-E
-1 Sykes
Berea 4-C
-1 Taylor
Brook Park 1C
-1 Sykes
Brook Park 2A
-1 Taylor
Cleveland 14-J
-1 Sykes
Cleveland 17-B
-1 Sykes
East Cleveland 4-H
-3 Sykes
Mayfield Heights 0-I
-1 Sykes
North Olmstead 1-A
-1 Sykes
North Olmstead 4G
-1 Sykes
Olmsted Falls 3-A
-2 Sykes
-2 Taylor
Richmond Heights 3-C
-1 Taylor
Shaker Heights 0-Q
-1 Sykes
South Euclid 2-A
-1 Sykes
University Heights 0-E
-1 Sykes
Westlake 2-B
-1 Sykes
Group B. The audit hand count results were higher than the GEMS reported count in these 11
precincts:
Broadview Heights 1-D
+1 Sykes
+1 Taylor
Broadview Heights 2-C
+1 Sykes
Cleveland 3-K
+1 Sykes
Cleveland 6-D
+1 Sykes
Cleveland 7-T
+1 Sykes
Cleveland 11-D
+1 Sykes
Highland Hills 0-A
+1 Sykes
+1 Taylor
Lyndhurst 4-C
+1 Sykes
Maple Heights 4-D
+1 Taylor
Rocky River 3-B
+1 Sykes
Seven Hills 4-B
+1 Taylor
Group C. The audit hand count results were both higher and lower for the candidates compared
to the GEMS reported count in precinct Lyndhurst 1-B with –1 Sykes vote and +1 Taylor vote.
Group D. The GEMS reported count was zero ballots counted and zero votes in precinct North
Olmsted 2-F. The folder for OS ballots for this precinct contained ballots (36 for Sykes, 21 for
Taylor, and 3 blank).
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Appendix 11
Investigation of Discrepancies in Optical Scan Audit
Discrepancy Evaluation – Group A
Examination of the Central Count report for information about the 16 precincts with
discrepancies of a lower count (Group A) showed that 11 of the precincts had ballot cards filed
in an additional location. Such ballot cards would have been included in the GEMS count but
because they were not present in the folder at the time of the audit, they would not have been
included in the audit tabulation. There appear to be two subgroups in this category. One group
has additional ballot cards misfiled as a minor component of another deck in numbers consistent
with the numbers of votes missing, i.e., three ballot cards per vote.
Specifically
Beachwood 0-E
Cleveland 14-J
East Cleveland 4-H
Mayfield Heights 0-I
North Olmstead 1-A
Olmsted Falls 3-A
Richmond Heights 3-C
Shaker Heights 0-Q

1 missing vote
1 missing vote
3 missing votes
1 missing vote
1 missing vote
4 missing votes
1 missing vote
1 missing vote

3 ballot cards wrong deck
3 ballot cards wrong deck
9 ballot cards wrong deck
3 ballot cards wrong deck
3 ballot cards wrong deck
12 ballot cards wrong deck
3 ballot cards wrong deck
3 ballot cards wrong deck

The second group has single ballot cards scanned in a deck that consisted of only that single
card. The origin of these single card decks is not known.
Specifically
Brook Park 1C
Brook Park 2A
North Olmstead 4G

1 missing vote 1 ballot card solo deck
1 missing vote 1 ballot card solo deck
1 missing vote 1 ballot card solo deck

These ballot cards were not recovered from their locations nor examined to determine votes
marked. The number of ballot cards in all cases was sufficient to account for the number of
votes that were missing from the respective precincts.
The discrepancies in the other five precincts in Group A could not be explained by this means
since there was no evidence found of ballot cards filed in locations other than the folder
examined by the audit.
Discrepancy Evaluation – Group B
Examination of the Central Count report for information about the 11 precincts with
discrepancies of a higher count (Group B) showed that six of the precincts had additional ballot
cards from other precincts included. These would not have been included in the GEMS count
but could possibly have been included in the audit tabulation if they were not recognized and
excluded.
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Specifically:
Broadview Heights 1-D
Broadview Heights 2-C
Cleveland 6-D
Highland Hills 0-A
Lyndhurst 4-C
Rocky River 3-B

2 extra votes
1 extra votes
1 extra votes
2 extra votes
1 extra votes
1 extra votes

4 cards other precincts
3 cards other precincts
3 cards other precincts
6 cards other precincts
3 cards other precincts
3 cards other precincts

During a second follow-up visit to the BOE, these precinct folders were re-examined specifically
to determine if the ballot cards from other precincts shown by the Central Count to be present
were in fact present and to determine if these ballots had been included in the audit count. In all
six of these precinct folders, ballot cards from other precincts were indeed present. In three
folders, the original audit count had apparently included the misfiled ballot cards and the
discrepancy was resolved when these were excluded. In the other three precincts, the misfiled
ballots had apparently been excluded at the time of the original audit (the misfiled ballots were
all placed first in each folder) and the re-count results excluding these were the same as those
found in the original audit.
The discrepancies in the other five precincts in Group B could not be explained by this means.
Group C - Other Discrepancy Evaluation
The one precinct (Group C; Lyndhurst 1-B ) in which the audit count was one vote high for one
candidate and one vote low for the other was also recounted and the results were found to be the
same as the original audit count.
NOTE: During this follow-up visit, five other precincts with discrepant results that were not
apparently explained or reconcilable by misfiled ballots were examined and re-counted. In all
cases the counts were the same as those from the initial audit.
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Appendix 12
Precincts with All or Most Optical Scan Ballots Missing from GEMS
Because we had by chance selected a precinct (North Olmsted 2F) that had OS ballots returned
but not recorded in the Central Count Report or on the SOVC report we were aware that this was
a possible explanation for no results and no ballots counted. An alternate explanation for zero
results would be if there were, in fact, no absentee ballots returned for these precincts. In an
attempt to determine if that was the case we determined the number of absentee ballots reported
returned for each of these precincts by November 3, 2006, the cutoff time for inclusion in the
early absentee scanning. This file was obtained from the BOE (absentee voters for November
2006.csv). Nine of the 11 precincts did not have any absentee ballots returned, but two others
did.
As a follow-up, the report of absentee ballots returned was compared to the number of ballots
reported in the GEMS report and ballots counted in the Central Count report for all precincts.
Within the limitations of the data and possible errors in the absentee information it appears likely
that all or nearly all of the ballots for at least several precincts were not included in the unofficial
SOVC. Specifically:
Chagrin Falls Twp A
Cleveland 2I
Cleveland 13X
North Olmsted 2F

126 voters
940 voters
920 voters
759 voters

11 abs returned
30 abs returned
12 abs returned
63 abs returned

0 SOVC
1 SOVC
1 SOVC
0 SOVC

We asked to examine these four decks and were able to examine three of them. One was not
able to be found and was not present on the log showing storage location. The documentation on
the folders for the three decks examined indicated that these ballots had been scanned during the
unofficial count. One of these had a notation “Reject delete” that had been erased but was still
readable. It appears that these precincts were deleted from the GEMS tally for some reason.
The precinct folders examined contained ballots in numbers corresponding to the number of
absentee ballots reported returned.
The procedure during scanning for the unofficial count required verification by the tabulation
staff that the number of pages reported on GEMS was within a certain margin of error of the
number of pages reported by the scanner. If not within that margin of error the tabulation staff
was to delete the batch result from GEMS and the deck was to be rescanned. In these cases, it is
possible that after deleting the digital batch from GEMS, the ballots were not rescanned but
simply put back in the file. Two precincts each showed one vote in GEMS because there was a
single ballot card for each of those precincts present in a deck that consisted of only the single
card.
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Appendix 13
BOE Email on Missing Batch in the Unofficial Count
-------- Original Message -------Subject:Missing Batch in the Unofficial Count
Date:Fri, 29 Dec 2006 13:28:30 -0800 (PST)
From:Frank James Hlad <fjhlad@yahoo.com>
To:Abigail Horn <abigail@urban.csuohio.edu>
We have no evidence of that missing batch in the unofficial count. As we said, it looks as if the
batch was scanned, deleted from GEMS, and never re-scanned. Austin had that printout that
Kurt was talking about, and the precinct showed no votes cast.
We have been unable to find transaction log information on that day. I am not certain if that's
because Matt and Brian don't know where to look or if the log doesn't exist. We did locate a
transaction log from the official count, but there was no way to sort or find data within it. It is
massive, as you might imagine.
I guess I don't know what to tell you about all this. Your point about dropping a batch in the
official count is well taken. Because we can't output data in any usable form from GEMS, we
really have no mechanism (except eyeballs) to catch a problem like that. F
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Appendix 14
Differences between files provided by the BOE for Optical Scan Audit

run date

Title in PDF

11/13/2006
(12:48 PM)

Post Absentee/Pre DRE

Name of File

Received
by Audit

Cards
Cast

Sykes

Taylor

gems sovc report post avos - pre tsx.pdf

11/13/2006

201,290

40,194

21,059

post avos- pre tsx data.csv

11/13/2006

201,290

40,194

21,059

11/27/2006
(7:52 AM)

filename Official, but
data is unofficial, inside
the document only titled
ABS

GEMS SOVC REPORT official AVOS only 1106.pdf

1/31/2007

201,595

40,321

21,068

1/31/2007
(10:54 AM)

ABS, Unofficial Results

GEMS SOVC REPORT Unofficial AVOS Only.pdf

1/31/2007(?)

201,473

40,307

21,109

11/13/2006
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Appendix 15
Email Exchange between the Monitor and DESI about GEMS Database
-------- Original Message -------Subject:Database Question posed by the Monitor
Date:Fri, 17 Nov 2006 16:28:21 -0500
From:Bellis, Chris <BellisC@diebold.com>
To:Michael Vu <bempv@cuyahogacounty.us>, Lou Irizarry <belmi@cuyahogacounty.us>,
Matthew Jaffe <bemij@cuyahogacounty.us>, Hiner, Jessica
<jessicah@dieboldes.com>, Candice Hoke <shoke@law.csuohio.edu>,
tryan@law.csuohio.edu
CC:Gwen Dillingham <begdx@cuyahogacounty.us>, Green, Pat <GreenP@diebold.com>
Earlier today as a result of the Monitor’s Investigation of a GEMS Database [a Monitor software
engineer] ran the following SQL statement on a mdb file off of a CD:
SELECT SUM(Vote Totals) from candidatecounter WHERE CANDVGROUPID = 1433
The resulting value was 186,205.
Then he ran the following statement on the same .mdb file
SELECT SUM(Vote Totals) from sumcandidatecounter WHERE CANDVGROUPID =
1433 AND VCENTERID <> -1
The resulting value was 186, 027.
Two questions emerged:
1.
Why is the value different?
2.
Why do we store candidate totals in two different tables?
ANSWER:
Chris,
The SumCandidateCounter table is used to store the totals by precinct rather than by counter
batch; this was done for performance reasons. The SumCandidateCounter table is updated from the
CandidateCounter table when a report is printed whereas the CandidateCounter table is updated when
the when the results are posted. Therefore if results had been posted since the last report was printed
the totals would not match.
Hope this helps.
Tab
Talbot Iredale, P.Eng,
Software Development Manager
Diebold Election Systems
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Appendix 16
Indicators that MAY Show Database Corruption
(Discovered in the Monitor’s Review of CCBOE Unofficial Results Database on 11/17/06) 10

1. Table element entries were missing date/time stamps of when the information was entered.
2. Table element entries had date/time stamps of January 1, 1970, which is the epoch (zeropoint) of UNIX time.
3. In an email dated November 3rd, 2006, from DESI’s Talbot Iredale, he claimed
"Accounting for transaction overhead, I do not expect the database to grow by more
than 100 MB during absentee processing. However this will vary dependent on what
other other activities (printing, reports, etc.) occur during the processing."
The database grew to a size greater than 100 MB for absentee processing and a size above 1000
MB for the full election. What happened? Why were the estimations wrong? Precision is very
important, especially when dealing with votes. Where else were DESI calculations imprecise?
4. Vote totals in two separate database tables held different values. DESI has provided a
response, but as of yet, this response has not been tested or verified.
5. In an email from Chris Bellis dated Monday, November 20, 2006, Mr. Bellis summarized the
"large amount of concurrent activity" that was occurring on the GEMS server on election night.
This included DRE uploads, the JResults server running, the AVServer running, and Digital
Guardian running, all interacting with the database in varying functions. In a subsequent email
from Jessica Hiner, dated Sunday, November 26, 2006, Ms. Hiner stated "In the context of an
online system with many users, Jet would not be an appropriate choice, but that is not how we
use it."


It appears in DESI's own words, Hiner acknowledges that when there is a large
amount of concurrent activity, Jet database corruption can occur. Chris Bellis has
said that on election night, there was a lot of concurrent activity on the server.
Taking these two statements together, it would seem very possible that corruption
may have occurred.

Microsoft's own documentation has stated that database corruption within JET is unavoidable.
This statement is without qualifiers. Normal operation of the Jet database includes corruption.

10

From a Monitor staff software engineer with substantial database expertise who conducted an initial review of the
unofficial election results database with representatives of DESI and the BOE present; the Monitor’s review was
limited to just over one hour. T resulting information was provided to Project Director Candice Hoke, who then
hand-delivered it to the Board Members at the November 2006 certification Board meeting.
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Appendix 17
Excerpt from Microsoft Documentation on JET-Access Databases
(emphasis added)
Security
Although Access databases (using the Jet engine) can be password protected and
encrypted, these databases do not have the same level of security as SQL Server or
mainframe database systems. If data security is critical, a SQL Server solution is the
better choice…. SQL Server allows distributed data in a controlled and highly secure
manner.

Data Integrity
Similarly, data integrity and recovery is not as robust on file-based databases using
Jet….
File server databases using Jet may become corrupt and require regular maintenance
to maintain optimal results. Even with maintenance, the chance of failure is much
higher than with SQL Server. ….

Transaction Logs and Rollbacks
If you need to know who modified what data, and undo changes, SQL Server's built-in
features and triggers support this [but not Access using JET—ed.]
An Access application can try to replicate the tracking of changes by managing user
interaction with the data. However, it would require programming and could not be
managed at the core data level. Mistakes in the application or other applications in
contact with the Access data could cause data changes that are not documented.
There are also no rollbacks [opportunities to “undo” the operation—ed.] in Access after
a transaction is committed.

The above paragraphs can be found in Microsoft Access or SQL Server: What's Right in Your
Organization? at
http://www.microsoft.com/sql/solutions/migration/access/compare-access.mspx
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